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ABSTRACT 
 
This annotated translation of an excerpt by Hirota Masaki makes available in English 
Hirota’s discussion, in Bunmei kaika to minshû ishiki (Civilization and enlightenment and the 
people’s consciousness), of the development of the people’s political subjectivity during Japan’s 
transformation from bakuhan bureaucracy to modern imperial state. The translation is preceded 
by a brief translator’s introduction, which places Hirota’s work into its historiographical context 
and directs the reader’s attention to key points in the excerpt.  
In this excerpt, one of Hirota’s primary concerns is the role that non-elites themselves 
played in the construction of the new polity. He argues that, far from being a monolithic entity, 
the village communities (which comprised the large majority of Japan’s population at the time) 
were composed of three different social strata, each with its own distinctive relation to bunmei 
kaika. For Hirota, the interactions among these different layers of society were instrumental in 
shaping the character of, and the tensions within, the modern Japanese nation. 
In the first half of the excerpt, Hirota analyzes the ruling class’s motivations for creating 
a national polity, and examines the uneasy combination of Enlightenment and Emperor 
ideologies that underpinned the kaika policies used to control the populace and harness its 
energies in service of the state. In the second half of the excerpt, Hirota examines the political 
subjectivities that were slowly beginning to emerge under the tumultuous political and social 
conditions of the late-Tokugawa and early-Meiji eras. He shows how these conditions, combined 
with the civilizational logic of the kaika policies, empowered some groups and disempowered 
others; and how the process of nation-building led to new forms of “degradation and 
discrimination” for the lower social strata. The result, he argues, was ultimately a “homogeneous 
nation” that, to this day, remains self-alienated and unequal. 
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TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION 
 
The annotated translation that follows is an excerpt from Bunmei kaika to minshû 
ishiki (Civilization and enlightenment and the people’s consciousness) by Hirota Masaki.1 
Hirota is one of the key figures of the minshûshi, or people’s history, school that came to 
prominence in Japan during the 1960s and 1970s and offered a radically new paradigm for 
historical research. The minshûshi historians treated “the people” of the Tokugawa (1603–
1868) and Meiji (1868–1912) eras as active subjects of social and political change; and in 
doing so, they introduced new topics and methods that have had a profound and lasting 
impact upon Japanese historiography.  
Hirota’s book, a paradigmatic example of minshûshi scholarship, is concerned with the 
development of the people’s political subjectivity during Japan’s transformation from 
bakuhan bureaucracy to modern imperial state. The phrase bunmei kaika in the book’s title— 
usually translated as “civilization and enlightenment,” and often shortened to kaika—was 
used during the period as a slogan and shorthand for the new Meiji government’s aggressive 
policies of modernization and Westernization, as well as for the radical changes in 
institutions, values, and social relations that these policies brought about. In particular, as a 
means to preserve Japan’s independence, the kaika policies abolished the caste system of the 
Tokugawa period and instituted a modern national polity based upon Western Enlightenment 
ideals.  
In the excerpt presented here, one of Hirota’s primary concerns is the role that non-
elites themselves played in the construction of the new polity. He argues that, far from being a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Hirota Masaki, Bunmei kaika to minshû ishiki, Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1980. (広田昌希『文明開化と民
衆意識』青木書店.) The translated excerpt comes from pp. 50–88 in Chapter II.  
Hirota (b. 1934) was born in Kôbe and graduated from Kyôto University in 1963. He held teaching 
positions at Hokkaidô Educational University, Okayama University, Ôsaka University, Kôshien 
University, and Kyôto Tachibana University. Though recently retired from teaching, he remains an 
active researcher and continues to address issues of gender, social discrimination, and nationalism in 
his publications and other scholarly activities.	 
	   2	  
monolithic entity, the village communities (which comprised the large majority of Japan’s 
population at the time) were composed of three different social strata—the wealthy farming 
class; the lower stratum; and the social outcasts and outsiders—each with its own distinctive 
relation to bunmei kaika. For Hirota, the interactions among these different layers of society 
were instrumental in shaping the character of, and the tensions within, the modern Japanese 
nation. 
 In the first half of the excerpt, Hirota analyzes the ruling class’s motivations for 
creating a national polity, and examines the uneasy combination of Enlightenment and 
Emperor ideologies that underpinned the kaika policies used to control the populace and 
harness its energies in service of the state. Because their objective was overcoming the 
Western threat, rather than the cultivation of a democratic citizenry, the elites often failed to 
recognize or acknowledge the growing self-awareness of non-elites. In the second half of the 
excerpt, Hirota examines the new political subjectivities nevertheless beginning to emerge 
under the tumultuous political and social conditions of the late-Tokugawa and early-Meiji 
eras.2 He shows how these conditions, combined with the civilizational logic of the kaika 
policies, empowered some groups and disempowered others; and how the process of nation-
building led to new forms of “degradation and discrimination” for the lower social strata. The 
result, he argues, was ultimately a “homogeneous nation” that, to this day, remains self-
alienated and unequal.  
 
1. The minshûshi school’s intervention in historiography 
In the early 1960s, Irokawa Daikichi began articulating his thesis that non-elites in 
Japanese society were not only aware of the momentous social and political changes taking 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The term most frequently used by Hirota is seiji shutai (政治主体), literally “political subject,” and 
sometimes shutaisei (主体性), or “subjectivity.” The terms have taken on a variety of (related) 
connotations in Japanese intellectual thought. For a brief and concise discussion of the various 
connotations, see J. Victor Koschmann, Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), 2–3. 
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place during the late-nineteenth century, but were responding to these changes as active 
subjects. In two articles written in 1960 and 1961 for The Historical Society of Japan, he 
argued that the formation of the Poor People’s Party and the Freedom and People’s Rights 
Party, the peasant riots of the 1880s, and various ideological struggles among the masses were 
evidence for the appearance of political subjectivities, not only in samurai and wealthy 
farmers, but also in craftspersons, tenant farmers, and other commoners.3 As he wrote in the 
English-language preface to The Culture of the Meiji Period:  
 
It was my aim to discredit the prevailing mode of Japanese cultural history, 
which was centered on intellectual elites—great thinkers, scholars, educators, 
and men of arts and letters. In its place I sought to produce a cultural history 
conceived from the standpoint of the common people—a deep social stratum 
that was in basic opposition to intellectual elites—by exploiting methods used 
by Japanese folklorists and historians of popular thought. My goal was nothing 
less than a paradigmatic change in the field of Japanese cultural history.4 
 
Over the next two decades, other minshûshi historians, including Kano Masanao, 
Yasumaru Yoshio, and Hirota Masaki, developed these themes and methods in various ways. 
For example, their projects included Kano’s evaluation of how social relations in rural 
villages during the early Meiji might lead to the establishment of capitalism; Yasumaru’s 
argument that indigenous thought formations, especially popular morality, generated an 
“energy” in the people that manifested itself in revolutionary social movements, and then lost 
its revolutionary potential as its values were co-opted by bureaucratic institutions; and 
Hirota’s careful analysis, given here, of the distinct and often-conflicting subjectivities that 
existed among various social strata of the people. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See “Konmintô to jiyûtô (The poor people’s party and the liberal party)” (1960) and “Jiyûminken 
undô no chikasui o kumumono (Drawing from the underground stream of the freedom and people’s 
rights movement)” (1961) published in the Society’s journal. See also, Meiji seishin shi (The Spirit of 
Meiji), Kôga Shobô, 1964).  
4 Daikichi Irokawa, The Culture of the Meiji Period, translation edited by Marius B. Jansen (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. vii. This preface was written expressly for the English-
language translation of Meiji no bunka (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1970).	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The topics and methodologies introduced by minshûshi scholars have become so much 
a part of mainstream Japanese historiography—both in Japan and elsewhere—that the 
newness of their approach can sometimes be lost from view. But at the time, their perspective 
constituted an important break from contemporary mainstream Marxist, modernist, and 
modernization theory approaches.5 
In the first few years after Japan’s defeat in 1945, intellectuals from across the 
political spectrum saw themselves, to use Maruyama Masao’s frequently quoted phrase, as 
members of a “community of contrition” (悔恨共同体,	 kaikon kyôdôtai), who felt compelled 
to ask how it was that they had either failed to anticipate, or failed to resist, the Japanese 
government’s turn to fascism.6 For the two most influential postwar approaches, Marxism and 
modernism, this meant revisiting the questions (and answers) that each had posed before the 
war, and testing out how their projects could be reframed in the fraught new context of 
Japan’s post-imperial “rehabilitation” under the American Occupation. 
Marxist social science and historiography, institutionally dominant in Japan from the 
1920s until its wartime suppression in the late-1930s, is perhaps best known for the fierce 
debate on capitalism, begun in 1927, between the Kôza-ha (Lecture faction) and Rônô-ha 
(Labor-Farmer faction) over Japan’s stage of economic and political development. Their 
dispute concerned whether Japan was ready for a one-stage proletarian socialist revolution, or 
still needed to undergo a two-stage process, first a bourgeois-democratic revolution and then a 
socialist revolution. At the heart of this sophisticated (and often esoteric) debate lay a 
fundamental disagreement: the Kôza-ha claimed that the Japan’s governance structures and 
agrarian sector were still pre-capitalist because of “feudal remnants” that were an impediment 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For descriptions of the minshûshi school, in English, see Carol Gluck, “The People in History: 
Recent Trends in Japanese Historiography,” Journal of Asian Studies 38 (1): 25–50 (Nov 1978); 
Takashi Fujitani, “Minshûshi as Critique of Orientalist Knowledges,” positions 6 (2): 303–322 (Fall 
1998). In Japanese, see Hirota Masaki, “Pandora no hako” in Nashonaru hisutorii o manabisuteru, ed. 
Naoki Sakai (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2006), 3–41.  
6 Maruyama Masao, “Kindai nihon no chishikijin (Modern Japanese intellectuals)” in Kôei no ichi 
kara: “gendai seiji no shisô to kôdô” tsuihô (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1982), 117.	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to capitalist development; the Rônô-ha argued that the peasantry was a capitalist formation 
whose semi-feudal characteristics were an effect of Japan’s latecomer status in the world 
system of capitalism.7  
The wartime censorship and suppression of Marxism cut short this debate, but many 
of the same themes and questions were articulated in the postwar context by a revitalized 
Marxist school. In the postwar, Marxist academics and activists once again began to quarrel 
over the nature of Japanese capitalism, debating whether socialism should aim for revolution 
or should proceed slowly through parliamentary means. In addition, new issues about the 
meaning and impact of the American Occupation, how to theorize and incorporate on-going 
labor unrest and workers’ protests, and other issues encouraged both factionalisms and new 
and influential theoretical work. Nonetheless, for most Marxist thinkers in both the prewar 
and the postwar contexts, the central question remained the revolutionary potential of the 
people.8  
The second postwar approach, kindaishugi, or modernism, was concerned with the 
democratization and modernization of the Japanese state; and in particular, how to create 
Japanese subjects who would internalize these values. Many of the modernists, including 
Ôtsuka Hisao (1907–1996) and Maruyama Masao (1914–1996), acknowledged explicit debts 
to Marxist theory, but they could not accept what they saw as its failure to theorize political 
subjectivity. They looked to varieties of liberal theory to address this problem and, in so 
doing, turned partly or wholly away from the question of class struggle either within, or 
against, the state.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See Germaine A. Hoston, Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1986), for a comprehensive study of this prewar debate between the Kôza-
ha and Rônô-ha. 
8 Postwar Marxist theory was not monolithic, however, and some Marxist scholars were sensitive to 
the questions of subjectivity and political action. See, for example, Koschmann, Revolution and 
Subjectivity in Postwar Japan, 95–110, for a discussion of Umemoto Katsumi’s efforts to create a 
materialist theory of subjectivity that included a theory of human ethicality. 
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Like the minshûshi scholars, the modernists criticized Marxism for ignoring the 
question of individual human autonomy. However, and this distinguishes them from the 
minshûshi scholars, the modernists associated this autonomy with capitalism and modern 
liberal democracy; and, crucially, they also believed that Japan had failed to become modern. 
Maruyama, in particular, believed that Japanese society and traditions were stagnant, and he 
identified the “patriarchal authority” of the emperor system as the cause of Japan’s thwarted 
development. As a consequence, the Japanese lacked the modern consciousness necessary for 
political subjectivity. They were still caught up in pre-modern ethnic and “community”-based 
forms of social organization; the goal of postwar social science was to finally destroy the 
emperor system ideology and develop genuine liberal democracy in Japan.9 
A third approach, kindaika, or modernization theory, which was closely linked to 
kindaishugi, began to appear in the mid-1950s as a response to the growing desire, in both 
Japan and the US, for Japan’s rehabilitation as a Cold War ally. The 1960 Hakone 
Conference, a meeting convened by American academics—notably including Edwin O. 
Reischauer, the new ambassador to Japan—is now widely viewed as propelling the 
acceptance of modernization theory in Japan as both an object of intellectual study and as a 
framework for national policymaking.10  
Unlike the modernists, kindaika promoters, such as Reischauer and the American and 
Japanese policymakers who helped to shape economic policy during the Occupation period 
and beyond, did not grapple at all with the category of class, which they regarded and 
dismissed class as a feature of Communist ideology. Nonetheless, the concept of modern 
liberal democratic subjectivity associated with kindaishugi, and the industrialization and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See Andrew E. Barshay, The Social Sciences in Modern Japan: the Marxian and Modernist 
Traditions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), especially Chapter 7, 197–239. 
10 See J. Victor Koschmann, “Modernization and Democratic Values: The ‘Japanese Model’ in the 
1960s” in Staging Growth, ed. David C. Engerman, et al. (Amherst and Boston: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2003); and Sebastian Conrad, “‘The Colonial Ties are Liquidated’: 
Modernization Theory, Post-War Japan and the Global Cold War,” Past and Present 216 (2012): 181–
214. 
	   7	  
economic policies of kindaika, were both concerned with the relationship between the state 
and its citizens. Both modernists and modernization theorists shared a desire to transform the 
peasantry into model citizens and productive industrial workers who would conform to, and 
obey, the needs of the state and the requirements of the global capitalist system. 
From the point of view of the minshûshi historians, missing from all of these 
approaches was a recognition of the subjectivity of the people as it actually existed and 
manifested itself. All three approaches were interested in harnessing the people’s energy for 
their respective political projects, but none placed fundamental value on understanding the 
people’s own perspectives, desires, or agency. While Marxists assigned a central role to the 
proletariat in revolutionary theory, it was the proletariat’s class position rather than their 
subjectivity that made them the motor force of history. Although modernists and 
modernization theorists assigned a central role to the development of the people’s 
subjectivity, this was future-oriented project, and it was to make them suitable objects of 
regulation by top-down forces of industry and production. Thus, despite their conflicting 
political aims, Marxist and liberal approaches shared an instrumentalizing view of the people. 
In addition, both Marxist and liberal ideologies were guilty of presupposing a 
universalistic framework, based on Western political and cultural ideals, in which Japan was 
defined (depending upon the context) as backward, deficient, anomalous, or late. As Irokawa 
stated in a sharp rebuke to Maruyama Masao for idealizing Western thought: 
  
What modernists have done is to take European civil society and extract a 
superior ideal type from it, whereas from the Japanese village kyôdôtai they 
educe an inferior ideal type. …[By comparing Japan and Europe in this way] 
we will continue to repeat the distortions of Weber and others who, being 
Europeans, pronounced arbitrarily from a Western perspective on the 
stagnation of Asian society.11  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Irokawa, The Culture of the Meiji Period, 279-80. See also Sebastian Conrad, “What Time is Japan? 
Problems of Comparative (Intercultural) Historiography,” History and Theory 38 (1): 67–83 (1999), 
for a discussion of the “hermeneutic priority of the West” in modernization theory. 
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The minshûshi historians, in contrast, argued for the emergence of a modern 
subjectivity based upon the energy of the people themselves. In doing so, they attributed an 
important role not only to the self-consciousness of the people in the formation of Japan’s 
modernity, but gave new scholarly significance to indigenous practices and grassroots social 
movements as well. This was neither a denial of external influences during the Meiji period, 
nor a total rejection of Marxist and modernization theory analyses. But placing “the people,” 
as active agents, at the center of Japan’s transformation marked a profound shift in 
perspective and method. 
 
2. The limits of the nation 
Minshûshi scholarship has thus forever changed the practice of Japanese 
historiography, directly and indirectly influencing the introduction of analytical methods from 
fields such as cultural anthropology and sociology, and legitimizing an ever-wider field of 
historical study that poses broad social and cultural questions about ordinary citizens, 
laborers, women, minorities, and immigrants.12 Hirota’s work has played an important role in 
this process. Of all the minshûshi scholars, he has done the most to problematize the concept 
of “the people.” And he has been the most interested in rectifying what he sees as a failure of 
Marxism, modernism, and even minshûshi itself: namely, the exclusion of the perspectives of 
the Ainu, Okinawans, and other marginalized groups and persons.13 
In the excerpt, Hirota offers an explanation for how exclusionary mechanisms may 
work against such groups. In his analysis of how the nation was constructed at its inception, 
he argues that bunmei kaika provided the wealthy farming class with a new political space in 
which to rearticulate its own interests as part of a universalistic, nationalist discourse. But the 
wealthy farming class itself continued to rule over the lower stratum, through appeals to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See Nagahara Keiji, “Reflections on Recent Trends in Japanese Historiography.” Journal of 
Japanese Studies 10 (1): 167–183 (1984).  
13 Hirota, pandora no hako, 13, 31.  
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popular morality and traditional religious authority. This lower stratum, in turn, felt 
increasingly besieged and alienated by the kaika policies that were forcing them to adopt the 
ways of the barbaric West and destroying the world they knew. In response, the lower stratum 
came to view the very lowest stratum as a buffer between itself and the influence of the West, 
such that, even though the lowest stratum was formally a part of the nation, its members were 
marked them out as targets of exclusion and discrimination. 
What Hirota has done is, in a sense, to produce an example of what Naoki Sakai has 
called “configuration”: the process by which a national community represents itself “only by 
making visible the figure of an other with which it engages in a translational relationship.”14 
He has also left us with an empirical question: do the same unequal relations exist in 
contemporary Japanese society? And if so, can Hirota’s explanatory mechanism be used to 
understand the marginalization of various groups today? It is tempting to, at the very least, to 
pursue the thought experiment, especially since many of the groups that Hirota identifies as 
part of the lowest stratum during the late-Tokugawa and early-Meiji periods remain as part of 
the lowest stratum today. 
The irony of this particular example of configuration is that both the lower and the 
lowest strata are purportedly members of the same national community. This may point to a 
limitation of Hirota’s approach—and perhaps a contradiction embedded within the concept of 
the “nation” itself. Hirota wants the common people to represent the Japanese nation, and at 
the same time he always retains the distinction between the common people and the lowest 
stratum, so that the latter is both part of, and yet always apart from, the national body. This is 
why Katsuya Hirano claims that “minshushi, initiated by a sense of mission to rewrite history 
from below, has in fact worked to deny the most marginalized people their place in history.”15 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Naoki Sakai, Translation and Subjectivity: On “Japan” and Cultural Nationalism (Minneapolis: 
The University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 15–16. 
15 Katsuya Hirano, “Postcolonial Turn and Unlearning the History of People (Minshushi),” paper 
presented at the Digital Archive and the Future of Transpacific Studies Conference at Cornell 
University, September 14, 2008, 2–3. 
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For Hirano, so long as minshûshi historians continue to use terms like “center” and 
“periphery,” or “lower” and “lowest,” to frame the relationship between, for example, 
Ainu/Okinawans and Japanese, the “fiction” of national belonging remains in place as a 
mechanism of exclusion rather than inclusion. 
Thus, while minshûshi scholarship has transformed and expanded the scope of 
Japanese historiography, it also comes up against its own limits: it remains a national history 
discourse that marks the “other” as disfavored and separate. How might such a limitation be 
overcome? As a final remark, it may be worth noting that a glaring omission in Hirota’s 
account, and in minshûshi scholarship generally, is the role that Japanese imperialism and 
colonialism has played in creating territorial and psychic borders and assigning groups to the 
margins of Japanese society. Japan’s own imperialism and colonialism haunt the entire 
historical period from the late Tokugawa through the Meiji period and beyond to the present 
day, and yet remain unanalyzed in Hirota’s work. I hope to critically address this omission in 
a paper-length version of this introduction, but for now would urge the reader of Hirota’s 
excerpt to ask how the visibility of Japan’s colonies changes the calculus in which the lower 
stratum’s discrimination toward the lowest stratum is a product only of the former’s fear of 
“the West.” 
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BUNMEI KAIKA TO MINSHÛ ISHIKI 
(CIVILIZATION AND ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE PEOPLE’S CONSCIOUSNESS) 
 
BY HIROTA MASAKI 
 
CHAPTER II: ENLIGHTENMENT THOUGHT AND BUNMEI KAIKA 
Section 1: The Development of Enlightenment Thought 
The character of nationalism 16 
Because the Enlightenment thinkers17 did not view the people (民衆) as political 
subjects (政治主体), they could not attempt the political mobilization of public sentiment. For 
these thinkers, who were aligned with the government’s perspective, it was sufficient to urge 
the nation’s (国民の) voluntary cooperation with the civilizing policies, because they saw 
Japan’s Westernization (西洋化) as the way to extinguish the threat from abroad. Although 
they sometimes praised the “national polity as one with the emperor” (皇統一系の国体) as the 
sign of a distinctive Japanese superiority over the West, they did not see the origin of this 
distinctiveness as the national polity itself, but only used it to advance the unique authority 
and function of the sovereign, who was propelling Westernization forward. For intellectuals 
of this period, the first principle of Westernization was to weaken anxiety about the Great 
Powers of the West. For example, they made numerous proposals concerning the issue of 
national language. But more than an interest in creating a common language for expressing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The character of nationalism is the fifth subsection from Part 1, Chapter II, section 1 of the book. 
The full monograph includes two parts: “Part 1. Bunmei kaika and the people” and “Part 2. Various 
forms of people’s consciousness.” 
17 Hirota is referring to the members of the Meirokusha (the Meiji 6 Society), named after the year 
(1873) in which the society was proposed by Mori Arinori. The society was officially founded in 1874 
and produced the highly influential journal, Meiroku zasshi, which introduced Western institutions and 
ideas to its readership. Fukuzawa Yukichi, Katô Hiroyuki, Mitsukuri Rinshô, Mitsukuri Shûhei, Mori 
Arinori, Nishimura Shigeki, Nakamura Masanao, Nishi Amane, Sugi Kôji, and Tsuda Mamichi were 
its founding members. 
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the common will of the nation, such proposals were an effective means of Westernization. 
This is why they came up with ideas such as English-ization and roman letter-ization, which 
were a complete break with Japan’s popular traditions (民族的伝統). 
Fukuzawa18 was the Enlightenment thinker most sensitive to nationalism. He used the 
slogan “independence of persons, independence of country” to effect a theory of natural rights 
in international relations for the “unrestrained rights of both persons and country based upon 
the reason of Heaven.” His theory of transparent nationalism is crystallized in the following:i 
 
So, according to the reason of Heaven and the ways of man, a nation should 
hold mutual intercourse with all the others, and when reason is against it, it 
should bow even before the black natives of Africa, and when reason is on its 
side, it should stand in defiance of the mighty warships of England and 
America, or when the honor of the country is at stake, every man in the whole 
nation should throw down his life to defend the glory of the country. Such 
should be the picture of a free and independent country. (An encouragement of 
learning (学問のすすめ, Gakumon no susume)) 19 
 
Fukuzawa is here expounding the rule of reason in the international community, harshly 
criticizing xenophobic self-righteousness, and making “personal independence” as rational 
subjectivity the central theme of nationalism. 
  Recognition of the rule of reason within the international community came about 
through the severance of traditional ties to the Sino-centered model that had been cultivated 
under Japanese isolationist policies for two centuries and some-odd decades. Sino-centered 
thought complemented and extended a view of the feudalistic domestic order as the moral 
order in which the bakuhan system was superior to all other systems. Furthermore, this moral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Fukuzawa Yukichi, 福澤諭吉, 1835–1901, scholar, writer, founder of Keio University, who wrote 
widely on education, civilizational theory, and Western thought and institutions. He was one of the 
most influential leaders of the Meiji Restoration. 
19 An encouragement of learning was a series of seventeen essays, written between 1872 and 1876. 
This quote is taken from Appendix II of Fukuzawa Yukichi, The Autobiography of Yukichi Fukuzawa, 
Revised Translation by Eiichi Kiyooka, Foreword by Carmen Blacker (New York and London: 
Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 394. 
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order was guaranteed through military power, so that domination of the populace (人民) by 
the ruling class was supported by morality and military power; and in the same way, 
domination of the barbarians (夷狄) was also authorized on these grounds. Since the medieval 
period, the ideology of the divine land of Japan (神国思想) has had, as a supplement, the 
particular characteristics of enigma and self-righteousness. For this reason, if the view of the 
domestic order and the view of the international order are two sides of the same coin, the 
failure of one immediately extends to the other. For example, when Shiba Kôkan20 stated that, 
from the perspective of Confucian morality, both the Shogun and the lowest outcaste (非人) 
are considered human beings, he also recognized the commonality of a moral sense of “family 
devotion, loyalty, and humanity” in Western societies (Dutch nativism (和蘭天説, Oranda 
tensetsu)).ii And we can see examples such as Watanabe Kazan21 and Takano Chôei22 who, 
because they were concerned with the people’s hardships, were aware of the question of the 
West’s “exceptional sympathy for the people (人民)” (Tale of the bojutsu dream (戊成夢物語, 
Bojutsu yume monogatari))iii. 
With the arrival of Perry’s ships, the promotion of Mitogaku xenophobia rapidly went 
bankrupt, as no one could deny the superiority of Western military power. The reform 
elements of the ruling class began upon the path of attempting to overcome the foreign threat 
by developing a rich country and strong army23 (富国強兵) through Westernization. At this 
time, they began to realize that military power and morality, which until then they had thought 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Shiba Kôkan, 司馬江漢, 1747–1818, painter and scholar of European studies, who produced both 
Western-style paintings and ukiyo-e prints. He also studied Western astronomy and published an 
illustrated volume on Copernican cosmology. 
21 Watanabe Kazan, 渡辺華山, 1793–1841, painter and scholar, influenced by Western art, science, and 
politics. He was a member of the samurai class and served as a retainer in the Tahara Domain. In 
1839, he was imprisoned for criticisms of the shogunate and exiled to Tahara the next year. 
22 Takano Chôei, 高野長英, 1804–1850, physician, scholar, and practitioner of Dutch-style medicine. 
His book, Tale of the bojutsu dream (1838), was critical of the shogunate’s isolationist policies. In 
1839, he was arrested and given a life sentence. He escaped after five years, and was captured by the 
police in 1850. He died while resisting arrest. 
23 “Rich country and strong army” was one of the principal slogans used by the Meiji government in 
its campaign to westernize Japan. 
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of as a unit, could be divided. From their perspective, the international community was the 
site of a power struggle for the survival of the fittest and they recognized Western military 
superiority; but even as they contemplated the Westernization of [Japan’s] military forces, 
they saw Japan as morally superior, and therefore grew determined that this was where they 
could secure a unique position for it. At the same time, they perceived that, in the 
international community, morality and  the rule of reason were equated, and they sought to 
use negotiation to make up for a deficiency in military power. Because the reform elements 
were aware of the duality in the international community of the rule of force and the rule of 
reason, they had no choice but to aim at Westernization. A position that placed emphasis on 
the former can be seen in Yoshida Shôin’s24 view, with its limitless convergence toward the 
authority of the emperor as the source of morality. A position that placed emphasis on the 
latter can be seen in Shônan’s25 path toward Western assimilation.iv Although Shônan was 
unable to produce a foundational critique of feudal control because he understood reason in 
the international community in terms of Confucian morality, the Enlightenment thinkers that 
belonged to his intellectual genealogy were able to mediate the disorder of the Meiji 
Restoration; and by dismantling Confucianism and organizing the activity of people in the 
domestic order through the concepts of independence and autonomy, they were able to come 
to an understanding of the international community according to the logic of Western 
civilization. Consequently, for the Enlightenment thinkers as well, the international context of 
“the strong eat the weak” was critical for Japan. Because they realized that this was regarded 
as a confrontation between the civilized and the uncivilized, and that confrontations among 
civilized nations were settled according to international public law, they put trust in the 
civilizing policies of the new government to quickly alleviate the international crisis. Within 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Yoshida Shôin, 吉田松陰, 1830–1859, scholar, teacher of Itô Hirobumi, the first Prime Minister of 
Japan. (Itô served as Prime Minster four times; 1885–88, 1892–96, 1898, 1900–1901). 
25 Yokoi Shônan, 横井小楠, 1809–1869, Confucian scholar, statesman. He called for government 
reforms and was placed under house arrest in Kumamoto in 1862, then freed by the Meiji government 
in 1868 and given a government post. He was assassinated in 1869. 
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this, the strength of Fukuzawa’s nationalism was to look not only at the civilizing forces 
directed by the government, but to make an equal demand for a national (国民的) ethos of 
personal independence.  
Because, for Fukuzawa, personal independence and the independence of the country 
were directly related, the logic of the practical science of social standing was deployed in 
international relations as well. Continuing the quote from above: “The Qing were unaware of 
the true international standing of their country; without taking measure of their own power 
and recklessly attempting to expel the foreigners, they instead found themselves being 
tormented by those barbarians (夷狄).” Fukuzawa’s criticism of the Qing Dynasty locates a 
state’s (国家) status in its power; and at the same time, he approves of annulling the rule of 
reason in dealing with those who overreach their status. Just as a despotic government is the 
fault of the people, aggression against Asia by the Western powers is, in the end, the 
responsibility of an invaded Asia because of its lack of civilization. This logic only increased 
Fukuzawa’s impulse toward Westernization, and conversely, strengthened his contempt for 
Asia. Thus, for him, status among states exists as a hierarchy in which the degree of 
civilization equals power; meaning that the rule of reason and the rule of force coincide in the 
international community. In his practical philosophy, the call for personal independence was 
precisely a call for a nationalism that competed with the equation of reason and force within 
the international community. However, I would argue that this personal independence was not 
something that presupposed the form of a communal will for the sake of national 
independence; rather, the independent energy of individuals had, as an effect, the character of 
actualizing the civilization and independence of the state (国家). In reality, what this meant 
was that every individual was to entrust the country’s fate to the government, and cultivate 
their energy in service of this. This issue is also deeply interconnected with Fukuzawa’s 
attitude, which set the destiny of the whole nation (国全体) on a course solely oriented toward 
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Westernization but neglected to unearth an independent role for Japan within the international 
community that would allow for an interrogation of the meaning of nationalism. 
	 
The decline of Enlightenment logic 
The January 1874 (Meiji 7) petition26 to establish an elected parliament was the first 
test for the Enlightenment thinkers. They had not offered political education to the people, nor 
had they anticipated that political subjectivity would appear in the governed. Of course, they 
had introduced Western constitutionalism, but had done so only as something envisioned for 
the future. The petition thus came as a great shock, and they uniformly opposed it as 
premature, on the grounds that civilization was only partially achieved and that the people 
were ignorant. However, it was precisely the advent of this political subjectivity that upset the 
authority of the prematurity thesis; and when day by day the influence of the petition 
increasingly shaped public opinion about freedom and people’s rights (自由民権), what had 
originally been for the Enlightenment thinkers nothing more than the politicization of the 
Enlightenment theory of the Rights of Man, could not help but engender a sense of crisis for 
Enlightenment theory itself to surmount, and they were eventually forced to reexamine their 
theories. Nishimura27 expressed his approval for an Itagaki-style28 elected parliament, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 The “Petition for the Establishment of a Popularly Elected Assembly” was submitted by the newly 
formed Aikoku Kôtô (Patriots Political Party). The Aikoku Kôtô was created by ex-government 
officials, including Saigô Takamori, Itagaki Taisuke, and Etô Shimpei, who had resigned from office 
following the Meiji 6 (1873) Political Crisis concerning the split in the government over Saigô’s 
proposal to invade Korea. 
The petition is generally considered to have launched the highly influential freedom and people’s 
rights movement (自由民権運動, Jiyûminkenundô), which called for parliamentary-style government, 
tax reductions, and civil rights such as freedom of speech and assembly. This movement, which had 
enormous support across class lines, lasted until the establishment of the Imperial Diet in 1890.  
27 Nishimura Shigeki, 西村茂樹, 1828–1902, founding member of Meirokusha, appointed to the 
Upper House of the Imperial Diet in 1890. 
28 Itagaki Taisuke, 板垣退助, 1837–1919, a leader of the freedom and people’s rights movement, a 
founding member of the Aikoku Kôtô, Home Minister in Ito Hirobumi’s second administration. 
“Itagaki-style” refers to a popularly elected assembly, as proposed in the January 1874 petition by 
Itagaki and others (see fn l above). 
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although Fukuzawa did not participate in the debate, both he and Nishimura joined others in 
setting a tone of gradualism with respect to the perspective of the ignorant masses (愚民観). 
As people’s rights theory gradually elevated the level of critique against despotic government, 
they began to realize the limits of their own Enlightenment-influenced training. The 
controversy over an elected parliament thus can be said to have marked the beginning of the 
decline of their Enlightenment logic. 
It is ironic that Meiroku zasshi (Meiji 6 Journal) was launched in March, just as this 
decline was beginning. At the January 1875 (Meiji 8) Osaka Conference, the government, 
feeling a sense of crisis about the euphoria of people’s rights theory, embraced Itagaki and his 
associates. Then in June of the same year it announced the “Libel Law” and “Publication 
Regulations” and began suppressing the speech of the people’s rights faction. Confronting this 
rise in tension, Fukuzawa proposed a “Bill to halt the publication of Meiroku zasshi.” That is, 
if the journal continued to publish under existing conditions, it would either need to “bend a 
little” or “become a government offender.” Since neither possibility was amenable to the 
journal, he proposed that the publication be discontinued, saying that “people must face their 
own responsibility.” As might be expected, when compared to the case for continuing 
publication made by Mori29 and Nishi,30 who were content with their bureaucratic positions, it 
was the issue as posed by Fukuzawa, who was outside of government, that got to the essence 
of the problem. In addition, he renounced the project, which had been loudly proclaimed by 
the Enlightenment thinkers, of maintaining, through shared responsibility, a completely 
unfettered spirit. This displayed exactly the Fukuzawa-style approach to independence that is 
expressed in the phrase, “face your own responsibility.” Meiroku zasshi ceased publication 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Mori Arinori, 森有礼, 1847–1889, founding member of Meirokusha; holder of several posts in the 
Meiji government including the first Minister of Education, ambassador to the United States, the Qing 
Dynasty, and Great Britain. He was also the founder of Hitotsubashi University. 
30 Nishi Amane, 西周, 1829–1897, founding member of Meirokusha, appointed to the Upper House of 
the Imperial Diet in 1890. 
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with volume 43 in November 1875. This incident surely reveals the Enlightenment thinkers’ 
awareness that the universality of Enlightenment logic was disappearing.  
In this way, inevitably, the Enlightenment thinkers who had entrusted politics to 
power (権力) were engulfed by politics; and in this process, little by little they forfeited their 
faith in natural rights theory and were forced to retreat from their Enlightenment enthusiasms. 
They were beset by the question of whether to seek a new theory from the advanced West, or 
to create their own theory by returning to Japan’s history and reality ( 現実).  
In the early period of An encouragement of learning, Fukuzawa emphasized “the 
equality of persons (人)” and “the equality of states (国).” In the later period bounded by Meiji 
7, from the sixth volume forward, he emphasized axioms for the maintenance of order, such 
as “the preciousness of state law” and “the duties of the nation (国民),” and at the same time 
he criticized political overzealousness. Moreover, in order to re-examine a situation that he 
had not entirely anticipated, and pressed by the necessity of “detailing the Japanese situation,” 
he embarked upon the writing of An outline of a theory of civilization (文明論の概略, 
Bunmeiron no gairyaku). An outline of a theory of civilization was the most important product 
of Japanese Enlightenment Thought (啓蒙思想) for arguing that even though Western 
civilization was not perfect, it was advanced in terms of its level of historical development, 
and therefore Japan ought to have Western civilization as its objective. And while the source 
of Western civilization’s development was the unrestricted evolution of “numerous elements,” 
An outline of a theory of civilization criticized Asia’s stagnation as resting on the suppression 
of freedom through “overemphasis on things” (事物) and “overemphasis on authority (権力).” 
From this perspective Fukuzawa criticized those who were completely devoted to Western 
studies [as well as] the eclectic Sinologists and the National Learning scholars, claiming that 
rights for the warrior class were also manifestations of old customs that overemphasized the 
political. What is significant is that, when compared to the discussion that he developed in the 
early period of An encouragement of learning around the absolute affirmation of natural rights 
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theory, Fukuzawa is here stressing the importance of relative value judgments, thus already 
revealing a shift in Enlightenment logic. This was necessitated precisely by the very idea of 
trying to discover the primary civilizing sources in Japan’s history and reality; and from these 
he uncovered the inheritance of the samurai’s “strength of heart and mind” and the farmer’s 
and merchant’s “economic strength,” leading him to assert that the active exchange between 
these was unmistakably the path to civilization. It is here, concerning the issue of kaika for the 
general public (国民一般) , that Enlightenment logic continues to be relevant. But by situating 
these hierarchical features historically, he generated factors that allowed them gradually to be 
solidified. That is, An outline of a theory of civilization became the classic work of transition 
from the logic of the Enlightenment to the logic of realism. 	 
After this, Fukuzawa gradually fixated on the reality that he observed. Starting from, 
“Human wisdom is equivalent to physical strength; if this is not transmitted through the 
generations, progress is not possible” (A theory of sovereign division (国権可分之説, Kokken 
kabun no setsu)), he proceeded to develop a theory of determinism through inherited wisdom 
and folly, which claimed that, “With respect to people who have social rank, or so-called 
worldly honor, it is possible for one to become their equal by means of a sudden change; but 
with respect to people who have inherited intelligence, or so-called natural merit, one cannot 
become their equal through swift promotion” (A theory of genealogy (系統論, Keitôron)). 
Quickly losing confidence in the Enlightenment enthusiasm toward the lower stratum of 
society (底辺民衆), he stated that, “Encouraging the vulgar people [lit. farmers and rickshaw 
drivers] to study and waiting for them to generate the will to do so is like planting a cedar 
seedling in pursuit of a sailing mast” (A theory of sovereign division); and he restricted 
himself to the civilizing force of the “ethics” “unique to the samurai class” (Decentralization 
theory (分権論, Bunkenron)). Fukuzawa, who had presupposed the ignorant masses (愚民) in 
the initial development of his theory of the common people (万人) and his theory of natural 
rights (天賦人権), confronted the reality of those pressing for samurai-class rights, those 
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engaging in samurai-class riots, and the self-assertion of those from below who were rioting 
against the new government and who were thereby intensifying opposition to the government. 
The false Enlightenment consciousness was ripped away from him, and he came to embrace 
reality from the standpoint of the government’s civilizing path and to depend on a reality that 
was based upon power (権力的現実). This also meant that he pushed to the forefront the fact 
of the natural inequality that had been in the background during the Enlightenment period. It 
was at the height of the people’s rights movement that Fukuzawa eventually declared that, 
“Although the theory of natural democratic rights is the right path, the theory of man-made 
sovereign right is expedient…we must be persons who obey the expedient” (Lecture on 
current events (時事小言, Jiji shôgen) 1881).v    	 
Even Nishi, who had optimistically presented the image of the ideal utilitarian person 
in his “Lectures on the three principles of life” (人世三宝説, Jinsei sanpôsetsu) and criticized 
the ethos of "loyalty of spirit"  (“Theory of the national ethos” (国民気風論, Kokumin 
kifûron))vi for having a servile character, emphasized in the Meiji teens that “loyalty of spirit,” 
a “unique feature of the Japanese nature” (“Warrior virtue” (兵家徳行, Heika tokkô)), was the 
basis of the army’s “samurai ethos.” He claimed that “although we should rely upon 
international law, what gives that law its effectiveness is, without exception, the force of 
bullets” (“Discourse on military service” (兵賦論, Heifuron)); and calling for military 
reinforcement and independent command authority, he participated in the drafting of the 
“Imperial Rescript.” Nishimura, also, in 1877 (Meiji 10), began expounding the necessity of 
Confucian morality in elementary education (“Inspection report” (巡視報告書, Junshi 
hôkokusho)). Katô31 as well, beginning in the Meiji teens, elucidated the idea of the survival 
of the fittest. In 1881 (Meiji 14), he announced that Enlightenment works written up to that 
time would go out of print, and the following year he published A new human rights theory (
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Katô Hiroyuki, 加藤弘之, 1836–1916, political scientist, founding member of Meirokusha, 
appointed to the Upper House of the Imperial Diet in 1890. 
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人権新設, Jinken shinsetsu) in which he claimed that natural rights theory was a “deluded 
theory,” and as he attacked people’s rights theory he developed survival-of-the-fittest social 
Darwinism.  
In this way, the Enlightenment thinkers used the Parliament disputes as an opportunity 
to begin bringing about the decline of Enlightenment logic and ambitions; and to completely 
abandon them in the even more intense confrontations during the middle of the Meiji 10 
decade.  They reappeared with a new logic—a logic firmly situated in a reality based on 
power (権力的現実). The stable balance they had maintained, by means of a fiction, between 
ideals and reality decisively collapsed; the logic of the superiority of actual power inside the 
country became a logic about the confrontations of stark power in the international 
community, and was perhaps a precocious version of imperialist thinking. We know that 
throughout this period they were consistent in their orientation toward the idea of a rich 
country and strong army. 
 
Section 2: Various aspects of bunmei kaika and the people 
Enlightenment Thought, seen earlier as the representative ideology of “bunmei kaika,” 
was not the only means by which the Meiji government sought to unify the nation (国民統合). 
The government’s “bunmei kaika” policies for an entire system of centralized authority, 
industrialization, and national education were put forward with the goal of attaining a rich 
country and strong army through Westernization, in order to confront the Great Powers of the 
West. These policies, which maintained and bureaucratized the former elements of rule, had 
to accommodate various complications and ideological elements. In particular, Emperor 
Thought (天皇思想), which had a low status in Enlightenment Thought, played an important 
role in carving out a point of departure for modern Emperor System ideology (近代天皇制イ
デオロギー). Therefore, by focusing here on the government’s national education policies, I 
want to examine Enlightenment Thought and Emperor Thought as two pillars of the 
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government’s kaika ideology and, in addition, to think about the various issues concerning the 
Japanese people (日本民衆) that accompany these policies.     
Recently, the relationship between bunmei kaika and the people has finally begun to 
receive notice, though there are still many challenges to a full grasp of the subject. More than 
anything, “bunmei kaika” produced inevitable tensions with existing traditions; but it is not 
always clear how we should understand these traditions, or how we should understand the 
people’s various forms of existence taken together as a whole. We have gathered a fair 
amount of research on the ideas of the wealthy farming class (豪農層),  but there is much to 
be done on topics concerning the lower stratum (底辺民衆). The lower stratum (subsistence 
farmers, impoverished peasants, semi-proletariats) were, on the one hand, being subsumed 
under the ideologies of the wealthy farming class; on the other hand, at the same time they 
were just starting to become aware of the differences of their particular world, and certainly, 
they developed distinctive responses to bunmei kaika. These unique issues must be examined. 
However, under the bakuhan system, the common people (一般民衆) were able to construct a 
common world only by discriminating against and using as a stepping stone those whom we 
must assign to the very lowest stratum, consisting of people from the abyss and the 
borderlands (最底辺の奈落と辺境の民衆). The process of constructing a homogeneous nation 
(均一的な国民化), through bunmei kaika that came from above, created new problems 
between these two groups. Thus, in order to grasp the connection to the overall construction 
of the people, here I will assume that the people can be organized into three layers: the 
wealthy farming class, the lower stratum of society, and groups who belong to the abyss and 
the borderlands. And then I wish to investigate this assumption. Of course, because the 
various responses of the people also included regional and qualitative differences, some 
problems cannot be unconditionally assessed using the three-layer structure, and in addition, 
at present much is not well understood about the group consciousness of those from the abyss 
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and the borderlands. At least, by positioning the people from the abyss and the borderlands 
within our field of vision, I believe we will be able to uncover new issues.* 
*I would like to note a few points. (1) Although I do not problematize the distinction here, the 
special meaning of “bunmei kaika” with respect to city dwellers is important. I hope to address this in 
the future. (2) The concept of the “lower stratum” may be ambiguous. For example, a semi-proletariat 
existence may fulfill a special role by bearing the impulse to destroy the community, or by creating a 
broader perspective or independent behavior within the community, and so forth. However, because 
the tendency of the semi-proletariat is not to create a unique worldview, but always to converge 
around the worldview of the small producer, here the semi-proletariat is included in the concept of the 
“lower stratum.” Thus, “lower stratum” as it is used here, refers to the existence of the workers and 
tenant farmers created by society through the process of primitive accumulation, up to the time of their 
distinctive last rebellion, the Chichibu Incident.32 (3) The “three-layer structure” is fundamentally the 
same as the one presented in my “bunmei kaika and the people (文明開化と民衆),” (in History of the 
Japanese People (日本民衆の歴史, Nihonminshû no rekishi), v. 6, Sanseido, 1974) and on some points 
reiterates what I stated there. This chapter attempts to tidy up some of the ambiguities from the 
previous version in anticipation of their future development. The study of Buraku history, as well as 
Ainu history, Okinawan history and so on, began in earnest in the 1960s and there has been a rich 
accumulation of research in various fields, but there has been no comprehensive attempt to understand 
them in relation to bunmei kaika. This chapter’s attempt must await further critique. (4) Again, while 
the samurai class and its special rights continued to persist, the great majority [of those with samurai-
class background] uniquely expressed the transitional character of gradually becoming commoners in 
this enlightenment period. This trend was discussed in detail in the previous chapter, so I will only 
mention two or three points here. First, with the exception of one portion that was preserved in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 The Chichibu Incident occurred in October 31–November 9, 1884 in Chichibu, Saitama Prefecture. 
It was one of the largest peasant uprisings of the period, and the government response to it was 
particularly harsh. Thousands of revolutionaries were killed, many thousands more arrested, and its 
ringleaders were sentenced to death.  
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kaika policies, the great majority of special rights for the samurai class were revoked. Dissatisfaction 
and opposition toward the kaika thus churned within them, exploding in the form of samurai 
rebellions. These rebellions were, however, completely different from the anti-bunmei tendencies of 
the people, which will be discussed below. The samurai rebellions were aimed at the restoration of 
their special rights, and had no bearing on the people’s discovery of subjectivity (主体性); moreover, 
they produced no new perspective on the relativization of the “bunmei kaika.” Second, because their 
dissatisfaction and opposition were expressed using the idea of people’s rights, they at least broke 
through the limits of Enlightenment Thought and offered a perspective that relativized the 
government’s version of kaika. Nevertheless, because they could not transcend their consciousness of 
special rights for the samurai class, a new thought formation could not be expected. After losing the 
foundation for the distinctiveness of the samurai, the people’s rights faction of the samurai class was 
no longer able to assert itself, other than by joining a different class as members of the intelligentsia. 
Third, however, we are still left with questions that should be investigated regarding the dispersal of 
the “warrior spirit” (武士的精神) that was brought about by the samurai becoming commoners. The 
so-called warrior spirit, which was already a mere shadow of itself by the Edo Period, was invigorated 
and politicized through emperor worship during the Bakumatsu. If we want to postulate that a definite 
continuity existed until this period, we must take into consideration the various ideas offered because 
of the new self-assertion of the wealthy farming class, along with the wicked inheritance of various 
concepts such as a contempt for the people and a spiritualism that are called to mind by a later 
nationalism. The “souls” of the warriors, which as Fukuzawa observed during the Satsuma Rebellion 
had become “spirits opposed to the Japanese people,” could provide no guidance whatsoever to 
themselves, and had to wait for the formation of a new subjectivity, like that of Uchimura Kanzô,33 to 
acquire a character that held some amount of significance.	 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Uchimura Kanzô, 内村鑑三, 1861–1930, literary scholar, Christian evangelist, pacifist, founder of 
the Mukyôkai (Non-church Movement).  
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Bunmei kaika policies and their ideology 
The kaika policies were extensively developed as a result of the abolishment of feudal 
domains and the establishment of prefectures. They were enacted in swift succession: in 1871 
(Meiji 4), the formation of the family register, the declaration making the four classes equal, 
abolition of the “eta-hinin” class, freedom to switch designated rice fields to cash crops, 
abolition of compulsory registration at temples, and the freedom to cut topknots; in 1872 
(Meiji 5), release of land from prohibitions against selling, establishment of uniform 
schooling, prohibition against the sale and purchase of persons, freedom of occupation and 
residence, and adoption of the solar calendar; in 1873 (Meiji 6), dissemination of the 
“Conscription Ordinance,” “Land Tax Reform Law,” and so on. These policies released the 
entire populace (人民) from bondage to the domain system and created a system of direct 
control through a centralized authority, constructed the basic conditions for a capitalist system 
of production, transplanted various culturally Western systems, and along with an awareness 
of the Great Western Powers, attempted to align the entire populace with bunmei kaika and 
the ideal of a rich country and strong army. 
The school system, which was considered the most enlightened of the kaika policies, 
was put into operation by temporarily abolishing the existing school system and dividing the 
country into eight university districts, 356 middle schools, and 53,760 elementary schools, 
modeled on the centralized system in France; while expressing the idealistic ambition that 
“there should be no uneducated family in the village, and no uneducated person in the 
family.” At the time, Fukuzawa’s influence on the Ministry of Education was substantial 
enough to produce the expression, “the Minister of Education is in Mita.”  His “Government 
directive concerning the encouragement of learning” criticized conventional learning as 
“ideological fiction.” And his logic that appealed to utilitarianism by endorsing “learning as 
capital for one’s success” while also explicating the necessity of practical science, along with 
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his theory that learning is everything and his logic that responsibility lies with the individual, 
were completely in line with his views in Gakumon no susume.	 
Both the notion that public education should be established at the primary level and an 
awareness of the importance of educating the general public were already recognized at the 
end of the Tokugawa Era, and planning had been done by the shogunate; but in the end they 
were never realized. The new government was keenly aware of the need to pacify the general 
public (人心) during this time of upheaval, and for this reason, it had an unprecedented 
enthusiasm for enhancing the authority of the emperor. But because it could not devise a 
principle for regulating the people’s daily existence from imperial authority and Shintô in and 
of themselves, in the same way that the “Five Public Notices” 34 reemphasized the “five 
Confucian filial-piety relationships” and reaffirmed the prohibition on Christianity, the 
government called for the preservation of traditional Confucian morality. The content of the 
“Directive for administering the prefectures” set forth in 1869 (Meiji 2) for systematically 
establishing the first elementary schools also attempted to instill the element of national 
consciousness (国家意識). Along with reading, writing, and calculation, it included “the 
necessity of instructing people to understand the circumstances of the national body (国体) 
and to know the way of loyalty and filial piety, and to genuinely care for the citizens’ lives.” 
But the real emphasis was on Confucian morality for the maintenance of public stability and 
order. If we compare them, we can say that the school system signaled a ground-breaking 
policy change for the government.vii Already in 1870 (Meiji 3), Iwakura Tomomi,35 in “Plans 
for founding the nation” (建国策, Kenkokusaku),viii written because of his impatience that 
“government authority has not been established at all,” emphasized that “in order to guide the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 These were the first Meiji government prohibitions and were published throughout the country on 
April 7, 1868, the day after the Meiji Emperor’s enthronement and the promulgation of the Five 
Charter Oath that set out the aims of the Meiji government. 
35 Iwakura Tomomi, 岩倉具視, 1825–1883, Minister of the Right in the Meiji government; led the 
1871–1872 Iwakura Mission, a diplomatic tour of Europe and the United States, soon after his 
appointment as Minister.  
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nation toward enlightenment and for it to grow in wealth and power” it is necessary that “no 
person in the country be uneducated.” This indicated a new direction for controlling the 
people. From around 1870 onward, the notable appearance of concepts such as “the equality 
of the four social classes,” “freedom,” and “equality” in the statements of bureaucrats, and in 
remarks such as Kido’s36 that: 
 
when the common people (一般人民) are released from the shackles that have 
bound them until now, and made to grasp the power of every kind of freedom, 
and the political power of the Imperial Court naturally manifests itself; finally, 
it will be impossible to maintain the various domains and the old customs, and 
therefore they will finally acquiesce to the Imperial Court (Letter to Sanjô (三
条宛書簡, Sanjô ate shokan),ix1870)  
 
certainly appeared as conceptual tools for rejecting the intermediary governing authority of 
the various domains and other institutions. Again, this was not simply a means for amassing 
direct authority over the populace (人民); it was a sign of the rise in awareness among 
statesmen that they were restructuring the very populace itself.  
In other words, the school system was established to repudiate Confucian ethics, 
which until then had been used in combination with imperial authority (Shintô) to pacify and 
attract public sentiment (民心). The school system was set out as a foundational undertaking 
for constructing a national polity (国民) for whom the idea of “managing production and 
promoting industry” would be compatible with the idea that Westernization equaled a rich 
country and strong army. For that reason, the government stressed the idea that “considerable 
weight will be placed upon elementary schools.” Nevertheless, this was perhaps the first time 
in Japanese history that power (権力) openly desired in this way to arouse utilitarian desires in 
the people (人民). The “Proclamation of Conscription” as well as the “path of granting 
equality and human rights to both the high and the low” emphasized uniform service to the 
state (国家) and attempted to directly create a utilitarian orientation toward it by declaring that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Kido Takayoshi, also known as Kido Kôin, 木戸孝允, 1833–1877, leader of the Meiji Restoration, 
statesman, member of the Iwakura Mission.  
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“protecting the state from disaster is the basis of protecting oneself from disaster.” This 
certainly represented an epoch-making emergence from the feudal Confucian state, and 
indicated that government officials saw in these things the true essence of Western capitalist 
civilization (just as the Enlightenment thinkers did), but they were able to attend only to its 
utilitarian aspects. Along with the poverty of their vision of the people (民衆), this revealed 
their lack of new principles for the formation of the common will (共通意志). With respect to 
the educational content of the school system, the government limited itself to providing 
examples of curricula and textbooks. The system was very unrestrictive when compared to the 
later nationalistic Emperor-System-centered education. Among the textbooks were many by 
Enlightenment thinkers, beginning with Fukuzawa’s All the countries of the world (世界国尽, 
Sekai kunizukushi) and An encouragement of learning; and the Ministry of Education also 
translated and published European and North American textbooks. The content specified by 
the government for higher education at levels above middle school relied entirely on the 
assimilation of the fruits of Western textbooks as well. Although we must recognize here the 
atmosphere of freedom and the ambitions regarding the inclination toward Westernization (文
明へ), these did not signify the cultivation of individuals with liberal subjectivities, nor did it 
indicate any consideration of the traditions or current realities of the people. Rather, it 
signified an intellectual temperament concerned with Western civilization. In this educational 
system, the educational content was not only at a remove from the lives of the people; the 
enterprise itself had an extremely violent character because the expenses for establishing and 
operating the schools were imposed upon the people, on the principle that they were the 
beneficiaries of the system. As will be discussed below, this generated tremendous resistance 
in the people, and kaika-era education reached a point of stagnation. The violence of the kaika 
policies toward the people was thoroughgoing; even the numbers under the “Conscription 
Ordinance,” the 19,000 soldiers who served in 1876 (Meiji 9) and the 32,000 known draft 
resisters, tell the story of the size of the people’s resistance. There were numerous revisions to 
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the schooling system and the “Conscription Ordinance” in the Meiji teens, and analogous to 
the Enlightenment thinkers’ trajectory of conversion, there was a gradual reorganization in the 
direction of Emperor-System nationalism (天皇制国家主義). Nevertheless, we can say that 
during the kaika period the people’s desire for their own emancipation produced a desire for 
education; and we must not overlook the passion with which the people absorbed, from their 
standpoint, Enlightenment Thought and Western civilization (西洋文明). Because the main 
currents of this sprang from the younger generations of the samurai class and the wealthy 
farming and business classes, attention must be paid to the development of what can be called 
a civilian (民間) bunmei kaika, through such things as the appearance of a cluster of private 
schools, including Keiô Gijuku,37 for Western learning, and the promotion of a movement by 
the wealthy farming class to establish local schools.x 
Looked at in this way, the ideology of the kaika policies seems to embody the very 
character of Enlightenment thinking. However, on the other hand, we must take into account 
how these policies were saturated with Emperor Thought, which had not been given a central 
position in Enlightenment Thought.  Above all, it was always under the name of the emperor 
that the various civilizing policies were implemented. 
The Meiji government began as an imperial state based on the authority of the 
emperor; but needless to say, because it originated with a fragile base of authority as “a 
government without military forces and without power,” it was at all times hard-pressed by 
the danger of “utter collapse.” Because [the imperial faction’s] military attacks on the 
shogunate had not relied upon any particular army, the government had to politically engage 
with a variety of different expectations, ranging from those of nobles and daimyo who had 
participated in attacks against the shogunate to those of the various strata among the people. 
Moreover, the government was aware that the aims of popular upheavals, which had begun 
with uprisings and riots from the Bakumatsu period forward, remained coiled around the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 This school, established in 1858 by Fukuzawa Yukichi, was the precursor to Keio University.  
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government as an extremely uncanny presence. Because of the immaturity of the absolutist 
holders of power, the government officials’ “establishment of authority” (天下創業) had to 
begin with a swift gathering of various powers into a unified power base, and at the same time 
the establishment of an overweening political authority that transcended those other powers. 
The solution came in the form of imperial authority, which was possessed of a just cause 
earned through the process of overthrowing the shogunate and restoring the emperor. Kido, 
Ôkubo,38 and other government officials made full use of this authority. However, although 
their use of it was certainly Machiavellian, this also meant that they themselves could not 
embody their own political power as something completely separate from the traditional 
authority of the emperor. They, too, possessed the attribute of being limited by imperial 
authority (and the practices that supported it such as Shintô ideology).  
In this way, the exaltation of the new government’s imperial authority inevitably 
carried an ambiguous value.xi In the decree for the restoration of the emperor, the emphasis on 
“establishing Emperor Jinmu” as the founding emperor was an assertion of the emperor’s 
legitimacy as a conqueror and ruler who transcended the shogun’s authority. In public notices, 
the emphasis on continuity with Amaterasu underscored the legitimacy of ethicists, religious 
leaders, and the proprietors of the “land of the gods,” while at the same time it usurped the 
traditional beliefs of the people. In effect, the emperor was promoted variously as an 
emancipator who was rescuing “people from their misery,” a virtuous ruler who bestowed 
blessings, a deeply compassionate patriarch, the possessor of the authority and capacity to 
enlarge his “imperial authority” by “confronting the nations of the world,” and moreover, an 
enlightened ruler who promoted the absorption of Western civilization by looking for 
consensus on state affairs, abolishing evil customs, and supporting universal justice. Since the 
dawn of history, sovereigns have directly appealed to the populace (人民) in this manner for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Ôkubo Toshimichi, 大久保利通, 1830–1878, leader of the Meiji Restoration, member of the Iwakura 
Mission, appointed Finance Minister in 1871, appointed Home Lord in 1873.  
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their legitimacy and authority. On the one hand, this is a means to reject completely the 
existing political authority and to establish an authority that transcends it, and on the other to 
indicate the direction in which the sovereign wishes to directly organize the energy of the 
people (民衆的イネルギー). But, in this case, because the traditional authority of the emperor 
was not self-supporting, that authority could not help but have an ambiguous value, and 
therefore had to be systematically incorporated by the government into the ideological basis 
of Shintô as it became the state religion. Nevertheless, the policy to adopt Shintô as the state 
religion was forcibly carried out through the 1868 (Meiji 1) proclamation of the unity of 
church and state, the proclamation of the revival of the Department of Divinities, and the edict 
separating Shintô and Buddhism; and again through the 1870 promulgation of the Imperial 
edict for the establishment of Shintô, and the 1871 policies that investigated and forced 
parishioners to convert to State Shintôism. This produced anti-Buddhist-movement riots and 
counter-riots, and these gradually came to provide a new space for the people’s self-assertion, 
revealing the impossibility of establishing the emperor’s authority through Shintô alone, or of 
controlling the inner life of the people.  
In 1872 (Meiji 5), the Ministry of Religious Education was established, replacing 
the Ministry of Divinities and abolishing the unity of church and state. The “Three principles 
of instruction” (三条教則, Sanjô kyôsoku)39 were promulgated and the propagation of a 
synthesis of Shintô and Buddhism was undertaken, with approximately 100,000 Shintô 
priests, Buddhist monks, and Confucian scholars mobilized as instructors of this synthesis. 
The “Three principles of instruction” and their embodiment in the “Seventeen themes” 
emphasized “Shintô and the Imperial Way” as well as instruction on bunmei kaika and the 
theme of a rich country and strong army. At the beginning of the Meiji Restoration, the 
authority of the emperor, which strove to transcend the various values that had risen from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 The three principles that teachers were supposed to instill in students were: (1) reverence for the 
gods and love of country, (2) right conduct, and (3) loyalty to the emperor. 
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below by absorbing them, came to hold a position of absolute superiority over other forms of 
power by monopolizing the aggressively promoted superior values of advanced civilization. 
Thus, the emperor’s authority had the confidence to realize itself without taking into account 
the situation of the people. Along with the adoption of the solar calendar, it abolished the 
people’s five traditional festivals and established a system of national holidays for the 
imperial state, including Empire Day and the Emperor’s birthday. In addition, in an attempt to 
place established religion within the framework of the emperor system, the authorities 
instituted repressive measures to treat folk religion (民衆宗教) as “heretical” and its prayers 
and rituals as barbaric. Ogawa Tameji’s “Questions and answers about kaika” (開化問答, 
Kaika mondô), which appears to be a text by a governmental religion instructor of the time, is 
a text written in colloquial style that explains kaika policies about such things as the abolition 
of feudal domains and the establishment of prefectures, the equalization of the four social 
classes, conscription, taxes, and foreign relations. In the text, in addition to explaining the 
progressiveness and rationality of the kaika policies, everything is linked to the emperor’s 
authority through examples such as the equality of the social classes that stems from “the 
emperor’s beneficence,” or regarding the consumption of meat, that “the emperor and others 
have, since ancient times, partaken of it.” That is, bunmei kaika ideology was a combination 
of imperial authority and the various values of bunmei; it was a combination of Emperor 
Thought and Enlightenment Thought.  However, in fact, the more that Emperor Thought 
embraced Enlightenment Thought, the more likely it was that the policies that had made 
Shintô the state religion would fail, because Enlightenment Thought touted the separation of 
government from ethics and religion, and the internal freedom of individuals. On the 
receiving end of criticism from Enlightenment thinkers such as Mori Arinori and members of 
a group of Buddhist reformers surrounding the monk Shimaji Mokurai,40 and more important, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Shimaji Mokurai, 島地黙雷, 1838–1911, influential priest of the Honganji sect of Jôdô Shinshu 
(Pure Land Buddhism).  
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pressed by the failure of religious instructors to propagate their policies, the Ministry of 
Religious Education was abolished in 1877 (Meiji 10). But because imperial authority existed 
side by side with bunmei kaika, so long as the fundamental path of bunmei kaika (capitalism) 
did not change, it was difficult to break down the communal illusion that constituted the 
Emperor-System state (天皇制国家). Nonetheless, placing cosmopolitan Enlightenment 
Thought, with its enthusiasm for a utilitarian spirit, at the forefront was a rejection of the 
Shintô elements of Emperor Thought, and made it possible for Fukuzawa to press forward 
with his rationalization for an idealized British monarchy. However, the public disorder 
caused by such things as democratic rights, samurai-class rebellions, and rebellions by the 
lower stratum could not be contained through natural human rights or a utilitarian spirit. And 
since Emperor Thought could not radiate a logic for constructing the daily life of the people, 
Confucianism was here called back into service. Thus, in developments from Meiji 10 
forward, the formative processes of Emperor-System ideology can be traced to the union of 
Emperor Thought, Confucianism, and Enlightenment Thought, as they underwent various 
transformations. Consequently, kaika policies after Meiji 10 changed rapidly, and it would be 
fitting to consider them as having a new aspect because of the “Meiji 14 Political Crisis.” 41 
 
Enlightenment of the wealthy farmer class 	 
The wealthy farming class, who made their appearance as distinct political subjects by 
the decade beginning with Meiji 10, had already begun to develop as leaders by the middle of 
the Edo Period in order to overcome the ruin of the villages. With the opening of the ports, 
they gradually awakened to the political order; and during the kaika period, with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 The Meiji 14 Political Crisis (明治十四年の政変), also known as the 1881 Political Crisis, was a 
decisive event in Japan’s modernization. On October 11, 1881, Ôkuma Shigenobu (大隈重信) was 
ousted from his position as Minister of Finance over disputes involving the sale of government 
property in Hokkaidô and, more fundamentally, his advocacy for the institution of a British-style 
parliament. Itô Hirobumi, Iwakura Tomomi, and other government officials who favored a Prussian-
style parliament engineered Ôkuma’s removal from office. 
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Enlightenment Thought as the intermediary, they seem to have made a great leap into the era 
of people’s rights as they absorbed modern Western thought. From the middle of the Edo 
Period forward, exploitation based on feudal power and usurious commercial capital 
gradually caused the ruin of the villages. In order to overcome this devastation, the wealthy 
farming class that controlled the villages worked diligently to provide leadership. Their 
principal methods consisted of instruction provided by Shingaku42 (心学) and other folk 
religions(民衆宗教), as well as subjective practices of popular morality (通俗道徳) based 
upon the central virtues of “diligence, economy, deference” espoused by elders such as 
Ninomiya Sontoku.xii,43 While the lower half of the wealthy farming class had an impulse to 
increase its own wealth, the upper half had a two-sided character: providing the terminus of 
authority as the dominant class in the village order, and representing the village community. 
Often, the impulse of the lower half was to accumulate wealth through such methods as 
embezzlement, fraud, and usurious lending, which utilized the mechanisms and authority of 
power. For this reason, they had to have been the frequent target of riots. And, in turn, they 
were compelled to provide leadership in overcoming the devastation of the villages. Because 
it was impossible for embezzlement and fraud to become social norms, the more the wealthy 
farming class posited itself (自己の定立) in terms of the fate of the community, the more it 
had to guide the lower stratum by setting an example through the practice of popular morality. 
And at that moment it was precisely through the ideology of popular morality that it justified 
its wealth. In objective terms, by reducing all of the feudal contradictions to matters of the 
heart, this so-called ideology of popular morality performed the function of supporting the 
feudal order from below. But in this context, the idealistic worldview (唯心論的世界観) that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Shingaku, also known as sekimon shingaku (石門心学), was a popular religious movement founded 
by Ishida Baigan (石田梅岩), 1685–1744, during the Edo Period; its teachings consisted of a blend of 
Shintô, Confucianism, and Buddhism. 
43 Ninomiya Sontoku, 二宮尊徳, 1787–1856, Edo Period intellectual, economist, agricultural leader. 
His teachings formed the basis of “moral requital” thought (報徳思想, hôtoku shisô), which guided the 
moral requital association movement of the 1880s. 
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regarded “all things [as coming] from the heart” (Ishida Baigan)44 had a form critical of the 
subservient, serf mentality that had existed until that time. Instead, it established a spiritual 
authority which proposed that “rich and poor, high and low, do not exist in heaven…but in the 
hearts of individuals” (Sontoku), and resulted in a view of spiritual equality that advocated 
“universal brotherhood through sincerity” (Kurozumi Munetada45). 
The growth in confidence towards this extremely abstract spiritual authority occurred 
within the framework of the small universe of the village, but gave birth to the discovery of an 
“artificiality” and “way of humanity” 46 (Sontoku) that were different from the “Way of 
Heaven”; and along with fostering the power to criticize such illogical aspects of everyday 
life as superstitious belief, it also turned a critical eye toward existing scholarship (the 
prevailing ideologies). Sontoku stated that, “The Way is not written, but lived.” Miura 
Meisuke, the leader of the Nambu-domain peasant uprising, also commented that, “Even if 
someone is a renowned Confucian scholar, we do not need to fear him.” And he left behind 
what might be called a model of a practical folk science (民衆的実学), which used 
experiential cognition to recognize rules that were inherent in their objects and to apply these 
in daily life to such matters as household financial planning, farming methods, and techniques 
for making medicine (Prison Diariesxiii). Because this practical folk science (民衆的実学) was 
fundamentally bound to morality and religion, it is no mistake to view it as a “practical 
science of ‘Ethics’” that stood in contrast to Fukuzawa’s “practical science of ‘Physics,’” and 
to evaluate it as an historical leap in Fukuzawa’s practical science and as the fruit of the 
modern spirit.xiv Nonetheless, in Meisuke, for example, there existed an independent sense of 
self-confidence based upon practical folk science that claimed, “Even without rice fields, one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Ishida Baigan, 石田梅岩, 1685–1744, founder of the Shingaku religion. Shingaku had its beginnings 
in a series of public lectures given by Ishida in Kyoto in 1729.  
45 Kurozumi Munetada, 黒住宗忠, 1780–1850, Shintô priest, founder of the Kurozumi religion in the 
late Tokugawa period.  
46 This is a reference to Sontoku’s admonition that heaven is eternal, but the way of humanity is 
artificial and thus falls apart if neglected. (From the fifth talk in Ninomiya-ô yawa (Sage Ninomiya’s 
Evening Talks), 二宮翁夜話、第五話：人道作為の道の諭し, various Japanese editions are available.) 
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can survive if one works daily.” Once exposed to modern science, this self-confidence had a 
character that allowed it to be transformed easily into the “practical science of ‘Physics.’” It is 
precisely the very fact that this possibility had already been widely established among the 
wealthy farmers, if no one else, which suggests it provided the historical foundation that 
greatly magnified the influence of Fukuzawa’s practical science. 
However, on the other hand, unless we presuppose a certain level of household 
financial stability and a broad perspective, Fukuzawa-style independence is not easy to come 
by. In fact, if anything, the special characteristic of practical folk science is that it cannot be 
separated from ethics and religion. That is, in the background of practical folk science is the 
solidarity and cooperation that connect people. If Fukuzawa’s practical science is a system of 
utility and individualism, then practical folk science, with its so-called idealistic worldview, is 
a system of abstinence and cooperation that is fundamentally different from Fukuzawa’s. Or 
to put it the other way around, those who could abandon the system of abstinence and 
cooperation were persons above a certain level within either the wealthy farming class or the 
middle-class city dwellers. For those in the lower stratum and for wealthy farmers who were 
greatly restricted by the community, this was not an easy thing to do. 
Given that the ideology of popular morality asserted obedience as a premise of the 
bakuhan system and repudiated rioting and destruction, no more than an anemic idea of the 
conception of a unique common order (民衆的秩序) was available to it. At the moment when 
the bakufu rapidly lost its authority through the opening of the country, and within the 
political void created by attacks on the shogunate, the wealthy farming class, which had 
directly confronted the energy of the lower stratum’s riots and destruction, desired the 
emergence of a strong authority to guarantee their own village systems, and thus for the first 
time they began to have their own political aspirations. For the majority, the Mito School’s 
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and National Learning School’s idea of sonjô was a conceptual key.47  Meisuke repudiated the 
Nambu domain and wished for direct control by the bakufu, and furthermore, turned to 
imperial authority. Kanno Hachirô,48 because of his awareness of the crisis in the villages, 
participated in the sonjô movement, in riots, and in criticism of the bakufu; and ultimately he 
foresaw “early signs of the country’s impending destruction” in the Aizu and Sendai domains. 
Furuhashi Terunori49 of Mikawa, who had participated in the pacification of peasant revolts, 
also reached the point of cooperating with the sonjô movement. These phenomena indicate a 
beginning awareness on the part of the wealthy farming class that they could posit themselves 
by raising issues at the national level. Eventually, some even began to express hints of a 
concept of world renewal (世直し),50 such as when Akagi Tadaharu51 (Kurozumi Munetada’s 
top student), a wealthy farmer from Mimasaka, stated, “Let us sweep away the troubles of the 
country and restore it to the ancient age of the gods, to the times of simplicity and honesty.” 
For this wealthy farming class, the Meiji Restoration invited great expectations that 
were the equivalent of a fantasy; and viewed in terms of their acquiescence to the idea of 
sonjô, the new government’s policies toward opening the country and its posture of state 
power gradually gave way to disillusionment. Many of the wealthy farmers viewed the crisis 
of their own economic base and the renewed crisis of the failure of the village system as a 
result of the opening of the country. They looked to the emperor as the center of their concept 
of the national, and were no different from the sonjô-faction supporters in attempting to locate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Sonjô is an abbreviation for sonnôjôi (尊王攘夷), which means “revere the emperor and expel the 
barbarians.”  
48 Kanno Hachirô, 菅野八郎, 1813–1888, farmer, intellectual, writer from Iwashiro Province. 
49 Furuhashi Terunori, 古橋暉皃, 1827–1892, wealthy farmer and agricultural business leader from 
Mikawa province. 
50 Yonaoshi, meaning world renewal or world rectification, was a term that became popular in the 
1860s, used by peasants (from what Hirota designates as the lower stratum) in uprisings against 
corruption, high taxes, and other social and economic changes taking place in village communities 
during the Bakumatsu and early Meiji periods. These uprisings were often millenarian in character and 
sometimes successful in producing local changes; but did create any lasting class consolidation of the 
lower stratum. See in the translation, p. 49ff. 
51 Akagi Tadaharu, 赤木忠春, 1816–1865, Mimasaka landowner and follower of Shintô. 
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Japan’s unique superiority there. But the fact that their base was in the villages and was 
strongly tied to farming life distinguishes them from [sonjô-faction] supporters. However, 
after the Meiji Restoration, the wealthy farming class in Kumamoto, which had espoused 
practical science under the influence of Shônan since the Bakumatsu period, quickly took up 
the formation of the political order. They reversed their support of the Shônan school of 
practical science and its attempt to achieve a rich country and strong army under the 
leadership of feudal lords. Through their own initiative, in order to ensure the prosperity of 
the people (民富形成) they experimented with abolishing special rights for feudal lords and 
with issuing declarations that reduced taxes; they conceived of the Kumamoto Upper and 
Lower Houses, with a Lower House that provided for “the equality of the four classes” and “a 
bidding system”; and in effect, created (in 1870) what was most likely the most advanced 
regional political power based upon the wealthy farming class. This was immediately crushed 
by the central government. But even after, the Kumamoto farmers organized the Cultivating 
Society (耕転社). Stating that, “Our country is based on the production of grain, which will 
inevitably lead us in the coming years into poverty; silkworm cultivation and tea manufacture 
are at this time the appropriate industries for our country,” (定約書, “Jôyakusho” 
(agreement)), they sought a way out of difficulty through the promotion of new industries; 
and the purchase of an American “machine for seeding fields” was undertaken for a test farm 
that was a family-style cooperative venture of the Tokutomi52 and other families. Eventually, 
their entrepreneurial spirit was displayed in the founding of a silk-spinning factory, a tea 
company, and a silk-weaving factory. This is a very special example, but it illustrates the 
prescience of the wealthy farming class; and it also represents the application of Fukuzawa’s 
practical science. However, the difference between these farmers and Fukuzawa’s practical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 A prominent farming family in Higo Province (Kumamoto Prefecture). The family patriarch, 
Tokutomi Ikkei (1822–1914), was a student of Yokoi Shônan; he was also the father of Tokutomi 
Sohô (1863–1957), journalist and historian who was an initial supporter of the freedom and people’s 
rights movement, and Tokutomi Roka (1868–1929), a noted author.  
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science is that their entrepreneurial spirit saw the barriers created by the kaika policies of a 
government that was “fighting for its own interests” and had forgotten the principle of 
“correcting public virtue, making effective use of public goods, and enriching public life.” In 
order to break these barriers down, they had no choice but to generalize their class advantages 
by advancing from a demand for tax reductions to a demand for the establishment of the 
National Diet. In the process, they formulated the idea of a system that proclaimed, “Leave it 
to citizens to work on distribution and the prices of things; all that the government officers 
who handle this need to do is the task of bookkeeping” (Petition by Yajima Naokata,53 tax 
discussion).xv While a majority of the wealthy farming class tasted a momentary 
disillusionment with the Meiji Restoration, and some turned their backs on the world of 
bunmei kaika in their despair, the general tendency was to grope for new ideas within kaika 
for reorganizing the villages. Kôno Banshû’s54 famous turning point, prompted by his reading 
of Mill’s Jiyû no kotowari [a translation of J.S. Mill’s On Liberty], impelled him toward the 
movement for establishing local councils. Furuhashi Terunori, who wanted to use popular 
morality to reconstruct the villages that had entrusted their aspirations to sonjô thought, took 
optimistic scientism as his turning point and came to advocate kaika for farming 
communities.xvi In all likelihood, for the wealthy farming class this bunmei kaika period 
reflected the emergence of a new world in which they could display their political and 
economic leadership. Learning activities for these things (directed not only at Western 
thought, but also at Confucianism, Buddhism, and National Learning) gained a stronghold in 
associations and cram schools; and activities geared toward local councils and industries of 
every kind were developed. This was the overture played before the leap ahead in the decade 
of Meiji 10. 	 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Yajima Naokata, 矢島直方, 1823–1885, from Kumamoto Prefecture, a student of Yokoi Shônan. 
54 Kôno Hironaka (aka Kôno Banshû) 河野広中, 1849–1923, elected member of the Lower House of 
the Imperial Diet, Speaker of the 10th session in the House of Representatives. 
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Thus, if we look at the central conceptual discoveries of the wealthy farming class, 
first, we must confirm, in terms of pre-kaika history, the establishment of an idealistic 
worldview and the accumulation of a standardized practical folk science under the auspices of 
the ideology of popular morality; and furthermore, the potential contained in the Bakumatsu 
and Meiji Restoration periods for groping toward a new political order. Second, because 
bunmei kaika identified the right to private property and rationalized the utilitarian person, the 
impulse toward wealth on the part of the lower half [of the wealthy farming class] secured 
civic rights here, both legally and morally. This was the framework of the Meiji state, with its 
prospects set out upon a grand scale; and for this reason Western civilization appeared to the 
wealthy farming class as if garbed in brilliant light. Third, however, bunmei had various 
implications for the relationship [of the wealthy farming class] to the village system that was 
bound to its upper half. In the view of those such as Nakamura Naozô55 and Funatsu 
Denjibei,56 who partially adopted Western farming methods during the kaika period but 
attempted a thoroughly labor-intensive method of farming while at the same time 
fundamentally depending upon popular morality, the most pressing need above all was aid for 
the entire community. Thus, even if they partially studied Fukuzawa-style practical science at 
that time, they must have fundamentally regarded it with suspicion as something that played 
havoc with the system of abstinence and cooperation. In fact, businesses that adopted Western 
farming methods in the kaika period were going bankrupt by the middle of the decade of 
Meiji 10; and even those like Furuhashi Terunori, who had declared their complete trust in 
bunmei, once again returned to the methods of the ideology of popular morality. A 
representative example is the rapid proliferation of the moral requital association movement (
報徳社運動) before and after Meiji 20. However, in the later half of the Meiji teens, the 
enormous advances in primitive accumulation greatly changed the structure of the cooperative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Nakamura Naozô, 中村直三, 1819–1882, agricultural leader from Nara Prefecture.  
56 Funatsu Denjibei, 船津伝次平, 1832–1989, agricultural leader from Gunma Prefecture.  
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system; and the wealthy farming class as well was forced to become self-aware of the limits 
of popular morality. Okada Ryôichirô’s 57 claim that the majority of the poor were lazy and 
extravagant, and therefore did not need to be given aid (“Discourse on family governance by 
the moral requital school” (報徳学斉家談, Hôtokugaku seikadan)), indicates a partial 
discarding of popular morality and an attempt to reorganize the ideology of popular morality 
upon the presupposition of the capitalistic reality of the survival of the fittest. Fourth, the 
demand for prosperity for the people ran up against the limits of Enlightenment Thought and 
began to orient itself toward the formation of a new political system to replace the 
government’s kaika policies. From the time of the Bakumatsu forward, Confucian and 
National Learning School concepts became a substantial stepping-stone in the emergence 
within the wealthy farming class of a political subjectivity that was fortified by the idea of 
democratic rights. But the issue is whether this contained “a path unrelated to ‘Westernizing 
modernism’ to which they, as people’s rights activists from the East, could avail themselves.” 
xvii The traditional ideas of Confucianism and the National Learning School undoubtedly 
aided their politicization, but at the same time, they gradually became captive to a public-
minded virtue consciousness (志士仁人意識)58 such that, even as they valued the energy of the 
lower stratum, they were hindered from trusting this stratum as subjects with whom to ally 
themselves. From this perspective, it is doubtful whether the wealthy farming class learned 
anything about the basis of  “Eastern modes” of being from the actual people (現実の民衆). 
Thus, the task of the creation of a democratic community in which the lower stratum 
participated as subjects was given little attention, and the wealthy farming class remained, as 
before, the ruling class with respect to the lower stratum. While mediated by traditional ideas, 
they saw superior value in Western civilization and they were caught up, within the same 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Okada Ryôichirô, 岡田良一郎, 1839–1915, industrialist, politician, member of the House of 
Representatives. 
58 The term shishi (志士), meaning patriot or public-minded person, was often used during this period 
to refer to sonjô activists. 
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arena as Enlightenment theory, by civilizational logic. In this civilization framework, they 
thrust the democratic order before the government’s iron-fisted kaika policies. The fruits of 
the ideology of freedom and people’s rights are to be highly evaluated as the summit of the 
bourgeois democracy attained by the Japanese populace (日本人民). But we must pay 
attention to the fact that these activists were unable to posit themselves as overcoming the 
Meiji state, and were sharing in the communal fantasy of a national destiny based on the 
civilizational logic of a rich country and strong army (on this point, the wealthy farming class 
associated with the moral requital association, which was different from the people's rights 
faction of the wealthy farming class, required an even stronger Meiji state framework for their 
own development). Thus, the people’s rights faction of the wealthy farming class also 
disdained the lower stratum for being at a remove from civilization, and at the same time 
wanted to bring into question solidarity with a backward Asia.xviii Only a tiny minority, 
including for example Nakae Chômin,59 Kitamura Tôkoku,60 and Sunaga Renzô,61 gradually 
attempted, in the course of the people's rights movement, to take on the hardship of the lower 
stratum as their own. In so doing, they labored to discover a new ideological wellspring, one 
in which the seeds of the potential for a people’s rights movement in Asia are just barely 
visible. 
 
Rebellion of the lower stratum 
If the wealthy farming class began theorizing itself, from the perspective of bunmei 
kaika, as standing at the summit of the village community, and transcending the village while 
at the same time controlling it; the lower stratum, which had to manage their own lives while 
being bound to the narrow perspective of the small universe of the village and its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Nakae Chômin, 中江兆民, 1847–1901, intellectual, journalist, statesman.  
60 Kitamura Tôkoku, 北村透谷, 1868–1894, literary critic, poet.  
61 Sunaga Renzô, 須長蓮造, (b. 1852), a central member of the 1884 convention to create the Konmintô 
(Poor People’s Party). 
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complementary community cooperation and rules, began to assert themselves precisely 
through that community. Various expressions of self-assertion in the lower stratum, though 
overwhelmingly a part of the ideological framework of the wealthy farming class, had 
gradually come to flourish from the middle of the Edo Period onward, with the conditions for 
world renewal ultimately emerging during the Bakumatsu and Meiji Restoration periods; but 
in confronting “bunmei kaika,” this self-assertion took a further qualitative leap or turn. The 
direct effect was riots against the new government, or what I call resistance against 
Westernization (文明), and the elevation of folk religions. But before investigating these 
developments, I would like to examine, as background history, the characteristics of the 
ideological formation (思想形成) of the lower stratum.   
First, the maxims of the ideology of popular morality (通俗道徳的イデオロギー). It is 
difficult to extract the unique characteristics of the lower stratum from these maxims that 
were shaped by the guidance of the wealthy farming class. But because they appealed for the 
reform of people’s traditional attitudes (人々の旧来の生活態度) and self-consciously 
attempted to reorganize community practices, even in the lower stratum that was steeped in a 
world of abject serf mentality, an image, founded upon an idealistic worldview, of humans as 
autonomous and struggling beings took hold; and the eyes of some members of the lower 
stratum were opened to such phenomena as the concept of equality and the self-aware 
administration of their communities. Of course, the ideology of popular morality took the 
bakuhan system as its premise; and when compared to the enormous physical labor and 
mental strain it imposed on the people, it was altogether powerless to relieve their hardships. 
Thus, as an escape from these hardships, the people were seduced by idleness and gambling, 
or looked to new religious movements and pilgrimages to Ise Shrine for a temporary escape. 
Furthermore, there was a gradual increase in the number of those who were overcome by 
hardship and left home or fled to the city. Although these [responses] were not self-conscious 
critiques of the feudal system, they were an objective measure of a certain amount of energy 
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that disturbed the system and they contained an opportunity for relativizing the feudal order. 
However, this was not the place from which heretical ideas emerged; rather, it was through 
the everyday moral critique of idleness, gambling, leaving home for the city, and so on, as the 
pursuits of society’s losers, that the ideology of popular morality as a social norm gradually 
began to control people. It is likely that the means by which the lower stratum—who did not 
possess the assets and authority, or the broad perspective and the cultivation of the wealthy 
farming class—escaped their crisis was by appealing to the narrow perspective of an even 
harsher system of abstinence, industriousness, and cooperation; this gradually became the 
mainstream of everyday thinking.  
And thus, second, the mounting crises—which were within the realm of the system 
of bakuhan authority that was originally supposed to provide security, and were also due to 
the utter ineffectiveness of popular morality—over such things as annual tax increases, natural 
disasters, and the opening of the country to the barbarians, gradually increased anxiety and 
mistrust toward power. The lower stratum began to rely on traditional religious authority, as 
well as on the illusion of world renewal, rather than on the authority of their own power. 
Above all, during the Bakumatsu and Meiji Restoration periods, a particular kind of utopian 
image appeared—in the Kurozumi, Tenri, and Konkô folk religions, as well as in the riots and 
uprisings that were the lower stratum’s most extreme expression of self-assertiveness—as the 
prevailing basis of the desire for world renewal that was visible in [phenomena such as] the 
new religious movements and “eejanaika” gatherings.62 Although this was not a direct 
negation of existing power, it symbolized a desire for a free, equal, and abundant communal 
society of small producers. We can recognize in their fantasies a self-awareness that was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 eejanaika gatherings were a phenomenon occurring in various places throughout western Japan, 
spreading as far north as Tôhoku and as far southwest as Shikoku, during July 1867-April 1868. In 
response to a series of national disasters and political crises, though without any clear political agenda 
or aims, people wearing festival costumes danced and sang through city streets in communal 
celebrations that could sometimes last for days. The name of the phenomenon comes from a song, 
sung by the protesters, which contained the phrase “eejanaika (what’s so bad about that?).” 
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certain to view its self-liberation through a dimension of the national; and the wealthy farming 
class sought to assimilate these fantasies into sonjô ideology through such things as military 
troops consisting of farmer soldiers.	 
Third, these fantasies, however, did not mature through popular struggle into a 
conception of political power unique to the people. Folk religions promised world renewal 
through their particular conceptions of god, but were unable to imagine a new order; likewise, 
there was no linkage to the riots and uprisings. The riots and uprisings gradually led to 
outright requests for reduction of taxes and reclamation of pawned lands and goods, and even 
requests for an “equal-field system of benevolent governance”63 (均田徳政) and so forth; but 
without a conception of power, there was, at best, democratization of the village order, with 
such things as the public election of village officials. Nonetheless, these conflicts resulted in 
the rapid development of leaders of fierce emotional strength, feelings of widespread 
solidarity among the people, organizations and tactics, and so on. And the demand for the 
public election of village officials signified the escape of the lower stratum from the control of 
the wealthy farming class and their self-awareness of their power to construct their own 
community. That is, the self-assertion of the lower stratum gradually began to awaken them to 
a world that was distinct from and antagonistic to the wealthy farming class. This was 
probably a world that shared, in common with China’s Taiping Rebellion, a community in 
which small producers were liberated. However, because ultimately they were unable to 
produce a conception of power, we have no choice but to describe them as having been 
saddled with an immaturity that was far inferior to the Taiping Rebellion. 	 
In any case, for the lower stratum engaged in this process of growth, “bunmei kaika” 
was utterly different from their world, and made its appearance as a hostile and eerie world 
that completely engulfed them with its overwhelming power. More than anything else, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 The equal-field system, originating in the Northern Wei Dynasty (386–534) in northern China, was 
a system of land distribution in which the government owned all land and assigned shares to individual 
families for use. A similar system was adopted in 7th-century Japan. 
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“bunmei kaika” assailed them, as kaika policy supported by the new government, through the 
full-scale expansion of the educational system, the conscription law, and revisions to land 
taxes, all of which arose from accession to opening the country, privileging Shintô as the state 
religion, and additionally, the abolition of the domain system. For the lower stratum, the 
policy of opening the country meant pandering to the barbarians and was the source of rising 
prices. The incorporation of Shintô as the state religion was misunderstood as constituting a 
fundamental upheaval of existing beliefs, and even as the enforcement of Christianity. The 
abolition of feudal domains and the establishment of prefectures was a complete repudiation 
of the existing world; the new world that the government was attempting to make was 
something beyond imagination; and such things as the organization of the family register, the 
education system, and the conscription law were obligations that completely disregarded 
existing customs. Moreover, if such things were seen as assimilations to the West, which until 
then had been viewed as barbaric, then along with being completely incomprehensible and 
giving rise to anxiety and dread, it was inevitable that they would have been received as 
attempts to completely deny the existential basis of the lower stratum’s already existing 
selfhood. Riots against the new government had been seen previously, but it was after the 
abolition of the domain system that they began in earnest. Beginning with the Aki Rebellion, 
which originated to prevent the removal of its feudal lord, there were rebellions in Mimasaka, 
Aki, Hôki, Sanuki, and Chikuzen64 in 1873 (Meiji 6). Rebellions such as the Mie Rebellion in 
1876 (Meiji 9) mark the peak of their widespread expansion, and this genealogy culminates 
with the Chichibu Rebellion in 1884 (Meiji 17). 
The affidavit of Fudeyasu Utarô,65 a leader of the Mimasaka Rebellion, demonstrates 
the antipathy that existed toward all of the kaika policies: “Although we are reluctant to say 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Mimasaka Province became part of Okayama Prefecture; Aki Province became part of Hiroshima 
Prefecture; Hôki Province became part of Tottori Prefecture; Sanuki is now Kagawa Prefecture; 
Chikuzen Province became part of Fukuoka Prefecture. 
65 Fudeyasu Utarô, 筆保卯太郎, 1843–1873, farmer and a leader of the Mimasaka Rebellion who was 
executed in July of that same year for his role in the rebellion. 
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so, recent ordinances have been disheartening and unsatisfying in every way; we indeed 
cannot accept, in particular, the conscription law, title deeds, education, slaughterhouses, the 
prohibition of topknots, the abolition of the designation of eta.” Furthermore, Fudeyasu could 
not help but conclude that, “Although we considered submitting a grievance letter regarding 
those points, under the present conditions, we realized that no matter how sincerely we asked, 
there would be no approval.” And because of this, he [and his followers] were determined to 
force the revocation of the kaika policies by “joining with co-conspirators, stirring rebellion, 
and ending villainy.” Proud of their overwhelming position of dominance here, they 
intuitively grasped the steadfast will of the powers that were attempting to force them to carry 
out the kaika policies; and they therefore believed that in order to resist, they must invest 
every fiber of their will and being. In these rebellions, a variety of wild rumors—such as 
“they will wring the blood from our veins,” “they will snatch out our livers,” “telegraph 
machines are sorcery,” “women, oxen, and chickens will be carried to foreign countries,” and 
“foreigners rule over us”—created a constant social atmosphere that intensified the anxiety of 
the lower stratum and frequently became an impetus for rebellion. These rumors were all 
misunderstandings; but they expressed just how sinister and foreign of an entity 
Westernization (文明的なもの) was for the lower stratum, and how much it was perceived to 
be a fearsomely large opponent that jeopardized the very foundation of their existing world. 
Consequently, these rebellions against Westernization had in common that the things they 
destroyed were strictly differentiated into categories such as government mechanisms that 
forcibly delivered Westernization and various Westernization phenomena (town halls, places 
for public notices, primary schools, telephone poles, people in Western dress…). During the 
Mie rebellion, as well, it was declared that, “Broadly speaking, things associated with the 
government are to be completely destroyed.” 
However, there was no clear emphasis in these rebellions. In Mimasaka, a group 
prepared a list of demands, but no movement developed as a whole. In this, we must surely 
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see the magnitude of the rebelling lower stratum’s psychological panic toward their fearsome 
opponent,xix and based on the lower stratum’s newfound awareness of a head-on confrontation 
with power, the leap away from a rebellion aimed at social reform. In other words, the lower 
stratum, standing nakedly exposed before Meiji political authority and the enormous power of 
Western civilization behind this authority, could not determine the effectiveness of their 
organization and tactics in the conventional uprisings they had cultivated; that is, for the first 
time they were forced to recognize the fundamental difference between their own world (自ら
の民衆的世界) and the world of bunmei (文明世界). At least in the case of Mimasaka, the 
leaders met often in order to prepare for rebellion, but in the end they could not discover an 
effective and clear-sighted method. Nonetheless, that their awareness of their own world was 
not a simplistic return to feudalism is clear from the fact that the demands prepared by the 
Mimasaka group contained the complete repudiation of feudal exploitation and an opposition 
to the new government. Thus, their rebellion was not merely a spontaneous outbreak, but was 
substantially self-aware; though the question must remain concerning the extent to which they 
planned a social order of their own in organizing the populace at large.  
Apart from the Chichibu Incident, which underwent the baptism of a determinate 
concept of the people’s rights, generally we do not see the idea of social order expressed in 
these rebellions. However, it is possible that the idea was reflected in the expressions of the 
founders of the Tenri and Maruyama sects. Nakayama Miki66 of the Tenri sect equated the 
Meiji government with Western civilization (西洋文明) in her statement that, “The true pillar 
of the high peak [the emperor] is a foreigner, this above all angers the gods.”  She also 
directed her hatred toward the kaika policies in remarking that, “Those who govern us treat 
the world according to their whims.” And she adopted a stance of total opposition to an 
equivalence of the Meiji state with the Western world (文明世界), stating that, “From now on, 
we must contrast the power of the gods with the power of those who rule over us.” At the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Nakayama Miki, 中山みき, 1798–1887, founder of the Tenri religion in the Tokugawa era.  
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same time, she clearly imagined a communal society of diligent and sincere small producers: 
“In this world, there will be bountiful harvests everywhere,” “Take heart: we shall not fall ill, 
die, or weaken,” “In the world, we are all brothers; there is no such thing as a stranger” (おふ
でさき, ofudesaki, 1874).67 Furthermore, Itô Rokurobê68 of the Maruyama sect, who saw the 
end of the world in the process of ferocious primitive accumulation that was occurring in the 
latter half of the decade of the Meiji teens, hurled the curse that “Westernization is the 
downfall of the people,” and repudiated the entirety of Westernizing phenomena (文明化的な
もの), from the Emperor as a symbol of Westernization (文明) to the National Diet and the 
Liberal Party. He stated that, “The rulers have turned to irrationality......unless reason comes 
from below, then nothing can take shape.” Declaring that he was taking a stand with the 
“lower classes” (下等人民), he championed their complete salvation. It must also be noted that 
this was in complete opposition to the inclination of the wealthy farming class during this 
period, who demonstrated through the ideology of popular morality a reality defined in terms 
of the survival of the fittest, and at the same time abandoned the poor.xx 
If we look at these rebellions by the lower stratum against Westernization from the 
perspective of world history, there are differences, beginning with their developmental stages, 
that come from variations in historical conditions. But, the worlds of small producers in the 
lower stratum during the period in which modern society emerged had in common their self-
assertions against capitalist civilization (資本主義文明). The most advanced example appears 
in the rebellions of the English Luddites, and the Lazzaretti revolt69 in Italy resembles a 
similar stage in Japan. Also, in rebellions such as the Boxer Rebellion in China and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Ofudesaki is one of the three founding scriptural texts of the Tenri sect, composed in waka style 
between Meiji 2 and Meiji 15 (1869–1882) by Nakayama Miki. (The other two are mikagura uta and 
osashizu.) 
68 Itô Rokurobê, 伊藤六郎兵衛, 1829–1894, founder of the Maruyama religion in the Bakumatsu 
period of the Tokugawa era.  
69 The Lazzarettist Movement was a millenarian movement supported by the Tuscan peasantry during 
a period of wrenching social changes brought about by the industrial revolution and the unification of 
Italy near the end of the 19th century. Its charismatic leader Davide Lazzaretti was gunned down by 
gendarmerie in 1878. 
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Donghak Rebellion in Korea, which occurred at the stage in which modern civilization was 
making its assault through imperialism, we can recognize a shared character at their 
foundations. In the case of the Luddites, the fact that we can perceive a modern rights 
consciousness suggests that they used a part of capitalist civilization (文明) as a weapon; but 
the small producers’ own world was asserted in religious terms against the whole of 
Westernization with its system of industrial production, private ownership, and such. For the 
exceedingly superstitious Boxers, their conception of social order was so premature, when 
compared to the Tenchôdenposei70 (天朝田畝制) of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, that it 
does not warrant discussion. However, this is the difference between a stage in which Western 
civilization has not been designated as an adversary, and a stage in which an intensely evil 
culture has to be challenged despite the futility of doing so. If we presume to abstract various 
factors and make a comparison, I believe we can identify the stage of the Taiping Heavenly 
Kingdom with uprisings for reform of the Bakumatsu; and the stage of the Boxers with 
uprisings against the new government.xxi These rebellions against Westernization were forced 
to admit defeat in the face of the overwhelming power and logic of Westernization, and had to 
swallow their resentment and let it permeate the very depths of their being. Furthermore, for 
that very reason, the later entanglement of the character of the rebellions with the particular 
character of the advance of Westernization (文明の開化) is unsurprising. The Luddites, the 
Lazzarettists, and the Boxers were each bolstered by a religious worldview, and their 
rebellions continued for several years. In the case of Japan, the rebellions were non-religious 
(that is, they did not have the weapon of a worldview that was in opposition to 
Westernization) and dissipated within one week at most. One can theorize about the 
sparseness of traditions of heterodox thinking, the authority of state power, and so on. But the 
slenderness of the Japanese people’s (日本民衆) rebellions against Westernization (文明), as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 An 1853 document, concerning the land system and administrative affairs, which served as a kind of 
constitution for the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom (1851–1864). 
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compared to others, surely posed a major limitation to precipitating a stance in the lower 
stratum against Western capitalist civilization. These resentments against Westernization were 
inherited by the Ômoto sect that was established in the Meiji mid-twenties, and emerged at 
times as strange eruptions. Subsequently, however, the Ômoto sect and the Maruyama sect 
quickly acquiesced to and merged with Emperor-System ideology, furnishing powerful 
energy through support from below. In light of this, we must inquire further about such issues 
as the weakness and self-complacency in the worldviews of these folk religions that had 
advocated fundamental dissent against Western civilization (partial dissent stirred up any 
number of -isms, including ultranationalism (国粋主義)).   
 
The perspective from the abyss and the borderlands 
Various people (民衆), beginning with “social outcasts” (賤民) who had been forced 
into the abyss of society, as well as peoples from the borderlands, including the Ainu, 
Okinawans, and remote islanders, had not in most cases made sufficient progress to assert 
themselves in the manner of the lower stratum’s rebellions against Westernization (文明). 
While these peoples each had different histories and had been placed in different conditions 
under the bakuhan system, in terms of the ruling structure and its ideology, they can be 
thought of as sharing a certain kind of reason to exist that was conferred upon them from the 
outside. The bakuhan system, in relation to the general population of farmers, craftsmen, and 
merchants, was a society characterized by its public posture (タテマエ) of guaranteeing a 
completed moral order, which was called a world of “benevolent rule,” by means of the 
transcendent morality and military strength of the ruling class. In addition, because bakuhan 
power enforced the removal (exclusion from the country (鎖国)) of barbarians (夷狄) and such 
peripheral groups as the Christians and fuju-fuse,71 as well as the elimination of famine, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 The fuju-fuse (不受不施) was a Nichiren Buddhist sect characterized by the belief that no offerings 
could be received from, or given to, those from other religions. These beliefs led to continual clashes 
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banditry, spiritual pollution, and so forth, it impressed upon the people (民衆) that it was able 
to maintain a stable, purified, communal world. As a result, the people were under the illusion 
that they could achieve stability in their own world through the benevolence of the bakuhan’s 
power.xxii Thus, the medium for expelling, or the buffer against, the otherness of the 
barbarian, the marginalized (異端), the starving, the thieving, the polluted, and so on, was the 
existence of the lowest stratum (最底辺の民衆) of the abyss and the borderlands. This 
organizational structure was established by the end of the 17th century, and the ideology that 
demonstrated this structure became dominant as well. The Ainu and Ryûkyû peoples, along 
with Korea, served as mediators, forming the outer wall of a double-layered, international 
boundary consisting of Ainu-Matsumae/Korea-Tsushima/Ryûkyû-Kagoshima, established so 
that bakuhan power could avoid assuming direct diplomatic responsibility in the outside 
world; and by demonstrating the capacity of its power to expel barbarians, served as a 
springboard for increasing the bakuhan’s authority over its own people (国内民衆).xxiii As 
bakuhan power placed these peripheral peoples (辺境民衆) under its own rule, it increased 
and supplemented the authority of its power by presenting them as “outside peoples” (化外の
民) and “alien peoples” (異邦の民) to its own people (国内民衆). However, because it was not 
necessary for power to show benevolence toward these peripheral populations, [the 
bakuhan’s] rule appeared as a matter of sheer military force that had cast aside any moral 
character. Economically, as well, these populations were disconnected from the system of 
feudal land rents, and for that reason could be treated as possible sources of revenue that 
could be forcibly extricated, outside of general systemic constraints. The “social outcasts” 
who were forced to the abyss were, on the one hand, forced into practices at the far edges of 
power for eliminating otherness, for example, as banditry officers; and at the same time, they 
were used as mediators who, as executioners and tanners, maintained an undefiled communal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
with the bakufu throughout the Tokugawa period. (Two splinter sects of fuju-fuse exist in Japan in the 
present day.)  
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world. In this sense, even though many other arguments may be made about them, it can be 
said that the pleasure quarters had also been given the mediating function of guaranteeing the 
purity of lineages and family structures. As the crisis of the bakuhan system gradually 
deepened, the policies that regulated and discriminated against the people in the lowest 
stratum were uniformly intensifying, and were linked to this mediating characteristic. 
If we are to position, in this manner, the existence of the people of the abyss and 
borderlands under the bakuhan system, then the national unification that resulted from the 
abolition of feudal domains and the establishment of prefectures—in short, “bunmei kaika”—
signified an effort at intermixing and assimilating the barbarians, i.e., the West, who until then 
had been excluded as constituting otherness, and it called for even the lowest stratum of the 
populace (最底辺民衆) to be incorporated into the state as equal members of the nation (国民
の一員). Because of the necessity both of establishing national borders and defending them, 
the peripheral populations who formed a buffer against the outside world had to be 
transformed from “outside peoples” and “alien peoples” into “imperial subjects (皇民).” And 
there was the fear of being criticized as uncivilized and uncouth by the civilized nations 
because of the existence of “social outcasts” and practically enslaved courtesans. Both a 
public posture (タテマエ) about the theory of natural human rights and diplomatic 
vulnerability were emphasized in the reasons for Katô Hiroyuki’s declaration that “the use of 
the terms eta and hinin shall be abolished.” In fact, criticism from other nations regarding the 
selling and buying of courtesans, stemming from the María Luz Incident, placed tremendous 
pressure on the government, sensitive as it was to the dispositions of Western nations. In 
domestic terms, the equalization of national subjects (国民) was carried out not only for the 
purpose of abolishing the special rights of the warrior class and thereby eliminating 
intermediary powers, but was essential for ensuring equality before the law so that the 
uniform enforcement of duties to the state (such as paying taxes and serving in the military) 
and a system of private ownership could be realized. The Meiji government thus dealt with 
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the peoples of the abyss and borderlands through the “Liberation Edict” (解放令) and 
assimilation policies. However, there was no financial support underpinning these policies. 
Moreover, they were seldom accompanied by reforms of political and social conditions to 
support liberation. Therefore, on the one hand, these groups pinned great hopes on the 
“Liberation Edict” and assimilation policies in their fight for liberation; on the other hand, 
they were destined to be flung, naked, from the existing traditional world into the civilized 
world (文明世界). 
Among the members of the lowest stratum, the hisabetsu buraku72 populace was the 
largest in number, and the most advanced in terms of subject formation. During the stage of 
the Bakumatsu, in cases such as the Tenpô-era Chôshû uprising, they were exploited through 
discrimination and separation policies, and as a result were antagonistic toward the general 
populace. At other times, such as in the Shibuzome uprising, they rose up against increased 
discrimination; and in situations such as the Tenpô-era Banshû uprising and the Keiô-era 
Tsuyama Reform uprising,73 they showed their maturity in collaborative actions undertaken 
with the general populace. In response to the “Liberation Edict” they were deeply moved, 
saying, “We know not when we can repay heaven’s grace,” and “We have come to know the 
depth of the emperor’s benevolence.” It was probably due to this kind of maturity at the end 
of the Bakumatsu that they were able to strive toward self-liberation by means of such actions 
as petitioning the villagers that they would “like to refuse all formerly accepted orders to 
serve as pursuers of thieves, scatterers of beggars, and discarders of cattle and horse 
carcasses.” The Ainu as well must have felt, however momentarily, a sense of emancipation at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 The terms hisabetsu buraku (被差別部落, lit. “discriminated hamlet(s)”) and hisabetsu burakumin (
被差別部落民, lit. “discriminated-hamlet people”) historically refer to feudal-era outcast communities. 
Persons descended from these communities continue to face significant social discrimination in Japan 
today. The terms buraku and burakumin, used in reference to contemporary issues, carry pejorative 
connotations. The terms dôwa and dôwa mondai (同和, 同和問題, assimilation, assimilation issue) are 
now generally preferred.  
73 Hirota is referring to various uprisings that occurred during the Tokugawa-period eras of Tenpô 
(1830–1843) and Keiô (1865–1868). Their dates are: Chôshû (1844), Shibuzome (1856), Banshû 
(1833), Tsuyama Reform (1866).  
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the abolishment of the trading post system (場所請負制) with its slave-like conditions of 
servitude and cruelty, and at the movement toward assimilation. Similarly, for the Okinawans, 
the process of transforming Ryûkyû into a prefecture, which eliminated the plundering that 
came from the dual-layered ruling structure of Satsuma and Ryûkyû, must have resulted in a 
momentary fantasy of liberation. In that respect, in contrast to the members of the lower 
stratum, who perceived the Restoration as a world-renewal fantasy and who feared their self-
destruction through the kaika policies and bunmei kaika; for the lowest stratum, bunmei kaika 
was ironically structured to provide a temporary illusion of freedom, even though, in 
actuality, it promised even greater degradation and discrimination for them as well.	 
The construction of this ironic gap may have given rise to an unhappy situation. In the 
Mimasaka rebellion against Westernization (文明), hisabetsu buraku groups were forced to 
make a pledge to return to their former status; a situation bluntly shown in the tragedies of 
immolation and butchery visited against buraku areas that rejected the pledge. Immediately 
following the proclamation of the “Liberation Edict,” movements to prevent its enforcement 
appeared in every region of the country. In the majority of these movements, sabotage of the 
Liberation edict and division policies were used by the local ruling class—and in particular, 
the class of village-level government officials—in order to maintain the social order. There 
are also many examples like the Mimasaka Rebellion in which the lower stratum themselves 
forced a return to buraku status. The lower stratum had to have grasped the Liberation Edict 
as one piece in a larger plan for Westernization; the erasure, by means of that edict, of the 
existence that they conceived of as mediating the security of the pure world of their 
established community was construed as certainly bringing about the collapse of that 
communal world itself. This same Mimasaka uprising for the reform of the Bakumatsu 
manifested itself as a notable riot by the untouchable (非人) class, and can be seen as a 
collaborative movement with discriminated groups (被差別民衆). The lower stratum, 
perceiving themselves as failing to benefit from the loss of authority by domain governments, 
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acted from the supposition that it was outside the world of social obligations and had become 
untouchable (非人化). At that moment, the village community that had been located within 
the framework of a world of social obligations lost its meaning; and this brought about the 
collaborative movement with discriminated groups. Of course, it is doubtful just how much 
this was truly an opportunity for destroying the existing community and forming a new 
communal order in which discriminated groups were on an equal footing. And for the lower 
stratum, in the rebellions against Westernization (文明), resisting the pressure of the powerful 
otherness of Westernization and, conversely, favoring a tendency toward the purification of 
the existing community were not contradictory behaviors. The intrinsic goal of the rebellions 
to completely eliminate exploitation based upon power was also the goal of communal self-
reliance and purification. Thus, it was absolutely vital, even more so than before, to secure the 
existence of the “social outcasts” (賤民) as a mediating force with which to defend against the 
spreading influence of the Western world (文明世界). When the lower stratum finally began 
to self-assert their own independent world, they had to regenerate an enormous wall of 
discrimination at a new level, and in doing so, they closed off their communities within the 
confines of a narrow framework. But until they destroy the framework of these communities 
and conceive the communal world at a new level, the people of the lower stratum and the 
people of the abyss and the borderlands will not be able to discover the path of self-
liberation.xxiv  
In a certain sense, bunmei kaika realized modern Japan. Bunmei kaika imposed the 
“success” of capitalism from above. However, because it also turned everything into 
individual (household) responsibility, the people (民衆) were able, for the first time, to assert 
themselves through the mediation of the community. But the weaker the economic footing of 
the lower stratum, the harder it was for them to make the logic of bunmei kaika their own. 
Thus, while respecting the overwhelming dominance of bunmei kaika, the people were all the 
more profoundly captured, under the guidance of the wealthy farming class, by popular 
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morality’s ideology of abstinence and industriousness. Modern Japan was impelled forward 
by the double-construct of the logic of bunmei kaika and the logic of popular morality. 
Accordingly, the logic of popular morality also embraced the bunmei logic of survival of the 
fittest, thus producing a structure that was contemptuous of (or self-alienating with respect to) 
the lower stratum and the abyss and the borderlands. The logic of bunmei kaika also acquired 
a sense of moral superiority by cladding itself in the outer skin of popular morality. Emperor-
System ideology was erected precisely on the foundation of a communal illusion of imperial 
authority that governed the construction of both of these [the logic of bunmei kaika and the 
logic of popular morality], and eventually it would come to display an enormous power of 
control.	 
	 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	 
ENDNOTES 
 
i In Maruyama Masao’s “Kaidai” (bibliographical essay) (prev cited) [in fn 26, Fukuzawa yukichi 
senshû (Selected works of Fukuzawa Yukichi), vol. 4, Iwanami Shoten, 1952] this appears as 
“Individual freedom and national independence, national independence and international equality, are 
supported by the exact same principle…for modern nationalism in Japan, a beautiful if hapless epoch 
of classical equilibrium.” (p. 415).	 
ii Shiba Kôkan, Oranda tensetsu (Dutch nativism) (Nakai Sôtarô, Shiba Kôkan, Atorie-sha, 1942). 
iii Takano Chôei, Bojutsu yume monogatari (Tale of the bojutsu dream), (prev cited [in fn 28, Iwanami 
Shoten, 1971], Nihonshisôtaikei (Survey of Japanese thought) 55). 
iv On the evolution of his perspective concerning foreignness, from the end of the bakufu to 
Enlightenment Thought, see Uete Michiari, prev cited opus [in fn 4, Nihonkindaishisô no keisei (The 
formation of modern Japanese thought), Iwanami Shoten, 1974); also, Kano Masanao, Nihonkindaika 
no shisô (Japanese modernization ideology) (prev cited) [in fn 5, Kenkyûsha, 1972], points out and 
cogently analyzes the two nationalisms of “the civilizational image and the Great Powers image.” 
v Maruyama Masao, in his “Kaidai” (bibliographical essay) (prev cited), states that in Fukuzawa’s 
“domestic political theory, generally there was continuity in the fundamental political principles 
themselves…in the case of his international politics, the change in his argument…extended deeply 
into the theory itself” (p. 412). Against this, Yasukawa Junosuke states, in Nihon kindaikyôiku no 
shisôkôzô (The construction of modern educational thought in Japan) (Shinhyôron Co., 1970), from a 
position diametrically opposed to Maruyama, that “Fukuzawa’s thought does not fundamentally 
change throughout his life…in the end, what changes is the political, economic, and social 
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environment of Meiji Japan that surrounds Fukuzawa… he resolutely proceeded down the path of his 
lifelong “great desire” for ‘national independence, and a rich country and strong army” (p. 14). I have 
emphasized that although Fukuzawa’s “great desire” never changed, for that very reason, the basic 
logic of his domestic and international political theory did change (see Hirota Masaki, “Fukuzawa ni 
okeru daisan no tenkai” (Fukuzawa’s third evolution), Shisô (Thought), v. 580) and that it is 
significant that Fukuzawa’s transformation advanced in parallel with the evolution of other 
Enlightenment thinkers.  	 
vi Nishi Amane, “Kokumin kifûron” (Theory of the national ethos), (Nishi amane zenshû (Complete 
works of Nishi Amane)), v. 3, Shûkô Shobô, 1966). References below to Nishi are to the Nishi amane 
zenshû. 
vii Tsuda Hideo, in “Minshûteki kyôiku undô to kenryoku ni yoru kôkyôiku no seiritsu” (The 
establishment of public education by means of the education movement and the power of the people), 
(Rekishigakukenkyû (Historical research), v. 370), emphasizes the continuity in both the “Directive 
for administering the prefectures” and “The school system” from the standpoint of the new 
government’s policy to instill a national consciousness. 
viii “Iwakura Tomomi-kô jikki (The account of lord Iwakura Tomomi),” middle volume, Iwakura 
kyûseki hozonkai (Iwakura Historical Preservation Assn.), 1906.	 
ix Sanjô Sanetomi, Letter of 20 August (Kido takayoshi jûbunsho (Papers of Kido Takayoshi), v. 4, 
Nihonshiseki Kyôkai, 1930).	 
x Tsuda Hideo, in the above cited work, evaluated the people’s (民衆) local school movement as “a 
concrete expression of the citizens’ (国民) consent to official education.” It is noteworthy that Tsuda 
points to historical forces in the development of the schooling system, but we must await further 
research on this topic. 	 
xi Fushida Shôzô, Tennôsei kokka no shihai genri (Principles of rule in the emperor-system state), 
(Miraisha, 1966) is a classic text that elucidates the characteristics of imperial authority and the logic 
of the Meiji government’s authority. In addition, for a discussion of the enhancement of the emperor’s 
authority, his travels, etc., see Irokawa Daikichi, Kindaikokka no shuppatsu (The beginning of the 
modern state), (Nihon no rekishi (Japanese history) 21, Chûô kôronsha, 1966) and Kano Masanao, 
Shihonshugi keiseiki no chitsujo ishiki (Perceptions of social order in capitalism’s formative period),  
(prev cited) [in fn 1, Chikuma Shobô, 1969].	 
xii See Yasumaru Yoshio, prev cited [in fn 13, “Kinsei shisôshi ni okeru dôtoku to seiji to keizai” 
(Morality, politics, and economics in early modern intellectual history), Nihonshi kenkyû (Studies in 
Japanese history), No. 49]. My assessment of the people’s thought in this work is fundamentally 
indebted to this work. 
xiii Miura Meisuke, Gokuchûki (Prison diary), (prev cited, Nihonshisô taikei (Survey of Japanese 
thought) 58, Minshû undô no shisô (Ideology of the people’s movement)).	 
xiv Maruyama Masao, “Fukuzawaniokeru ‘jitsugaku’ no tenkai” (The evolution of Fukuzawa’s 
“practical science”), (prev cited) [in fn 30, Tôyô bunka kenkyû, No. 3]. 
xv Ôe Shinobu, Meijikokka no seiritsu (Formation of the Meiji state), Minerva Shobô, 1960. 
xvi Ôhama Tetsuya, “Meiji jûnendai no nôson to jirikikôsei” (The farming communities in the decade 
of Meiji 10 and their self-reorganization) (Nihon rekishi (Japanese history), No. 246). 
xvii Irokawa Daikichi, Shinpen meijiseishinshi (A history of the Meiji spirit, new edition), (prev cited) 
[in fn 3, Chûô Kôronsha, 1973], p. 351. 
xviii Yamada Shôji, see “Seikanron • jiyûminkenron • bunmei kaikaron” (Korea annexation theory • 
freedom and people’s rights theory • civilization and enlightenment movement theory (included in 
Ronshû nihonrekishi 10 Jiyûminken (Collected essays in Japanese history 10 Freedom and people’s 
Rights), Yûseidô, 1973). 	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xix Yasumaru Yoshio, prev cited [in fn 13, “Kinseishisôshi ni okeru dôtoku to seiji to keizai” (morality, 
politics, and economics in the history of modern thought) (Nihonshi kenkyû (Research in Japanese 
history) v. 49 ], p. 275. 
xx Emura Eiichi, in “Jiyûminken undô to minshû” (The freedom and people’s rights movement and the 
people) (Nihonminshû no rekishi (The history of the Japanese people), vol. 6), stresses that, “The 
Maruyama sect and the People’s Movement to Establish the National Diet were not contradictory. The 
Maruyama sect, which had won over the lower strata of the people, contained the hidden possibility of 
a logic that could unite it with the civil rights movement” (p. 130). However, the fact that there were 
those among its believers who supported the people’s rights does not point immediately to the 
possibility of founder Maruyama’s ideas; the total negation of Western civilization expressed in the 
claim that “Westernization is the downfall of the people” and the attempted “subsumption” even of 
Westerners in the teachings of the Maruyama sect are not contradictory things. Emura unexpectedly 
stipulates that the riots of the Maruyama sect Mi group [trans. note: the Mi Group was founded by 
Tanigaoka Heishichirô of Shizuoka] had different aims than the people’s right’s movement (p. 184), 
but the Mi Group riots also exhibited the essence of the Maruyama sect. Nevertheless, we have to note 
the enormous difference here between the tendency to evaluate the people’s rights movement as 
having subsumed the worldview of the lower strata or to have merged with it, and the tendency to 
evaluate the two as being essentially different. This is certainly an issue that requires further 
investigation.	 
xxi One point of view for evaluating the Luddites is an emphasis on the character of the working class. 
But I view the character of the small producers as fundamental; in addition, I believe that a decisive 
difference with the Boxers is that while it is true the Taiping Rebellion was aware of the great Western 
powers, it did not assume that the Great Powers were the enemy. Further research on these points is 
greatly anticipated. Also, in the so-called world renewal uprisings and the anti-new government 
uprisings of the Bakumatsu and Meiji Restoration periods, the same class character was at the core of 
the uprisings; but we must emphasize the difference in their objectives and tactics, and especially in 
their states of consciousness. Above all else, this is because in the case of the latter, at least from the 
point of the view of the people, the opposition between the Western world (文明世界) and the world of 
the people (民衆世界) was the central problem. Identifying a continuity with the Chichibu Incident is 
nothing more than an insight gleaned from that perspective.	 
xxii Yasumaru Yoshio, prev cited, p. 279. 
xxiii See Asao Naohiro, see “Sakokusei no seiritsu” (The establishment of the closed country policy) 
(Kôza nihonshi 4 Bakuhansei shakai (Lecture on Japanese history 4: society in the bakuhan system)). 
xxiv Irokawa Daikichi’s “Kindai nihon no kyôdôtai” (The community in modern Japan) (Tsurumi 
Kazuko, et al. ed., Shisô no bôken (Adventures in thought), Chikuma Shobô, 1974) presents an 
intriguing theory; he argues that the community of the natural village and the administrative village 
must be distinguished and that the natural village community must be reassessed, and he emphasizes 
the “principle of equality, principle of collectivity, meritocracy, the principle of self-defense, and so on” 
(p. 242) of the natural village community. As a critique of the understanding of community that 
Maruyama Masao and others have, I believe these claims possess a certain validity; but on the point in 
question here, I take issue with the notion of establishing the village as having its own self-contained 
character. Although the early modern village community must certainly have maintained the fantasy of 
having its own self-contained community, we must ask if it was always premised upon obligating 
itself to power, and a fantasy of the indispensability of social outcasts as mediators. Perhaps the 
principle of equality is also based upon such a limitation; again, we must clearly distinguish between 
how equality actually functions and how we wish that it did.	 
